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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over 150 years ago, the Supreme Court expanded the potential scope of
patents by adopting a doctrine to prevent “substantial copies” of an
invention by providing coverage over inventions that are “equivalent” to that
patented. 1 The doctrine of equivalents had been consistently applied by
courts until its rapid “demise” between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s.
In recent years, distinguished academics have studied the so-called
“demise” of the doctrine of equivalents. Professors John Allison, Mark
Lemley, and Lee Petherbridge have each empirically analyzed this doctrine.
All of their studies conclude that successful use of the doctrine has
substantially diminished over time.2 With very little detail or support, Allison
and Lemley speculated that trial court judges caused the death of the doctrine
of equivalents after they were tasked with construing the scope of patent
1. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853).
2. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 958 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371, 1378–79 (2010) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Doctrine of
Equivalents]; Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 215, 233 (2008) [hereinafter Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect].
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claims in Markman v. Westview Instruments.3 They contended that if trial judges
learned the technology and ruled against the patentee on claim construction,4
they desired to resolve the entire dispute, which required adjudicating the
equivalents claim against the patentee as well. 5 Petherbridge offered a
different theory. He provided evidence that the decline occurred years after
Markman, only after a significant Supreme Court decision on the doctrine of
equivalents, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,6 which reduced
the applicability of the doctrine.7 While each of these researchers noted that
the doctrine of equivalents had decreased in its successful use and provided
some grounds for the decrease, none clearly explained why. As such, the
cause and precise mechanism behind the so-called “demise” of the doctrine
of equivalents have largely been mysterious.
This Article sheds light on the mystery by providing a novel theoretical
model and extensive empirical evidence to explain the decline of the
doctrine. In large part, the demise occurred as a result of two complementary
forces discussed for the first time in this Article: “doctrinal reallocation” and
“doctrinal displacement.”8
Appellate courts have the power to engage in “doctrinal reallocation” by
altering adjudicatory control of a doctrine. Control can be regulated in
numerous ways. For example, the decision-maker tasked with adjudicating
the doctrine in question can be shifted at the trial-court level from the jury to
the judge, or vice-versa. Or, the appellate court may increase its control by
reviewing lower court decisions de novo instead of under a clearly erroneous
standard. These are forms of “doctrinal reallocation.” Once control of a
doctrine increases, a higher court may alter the prominence of the doctrine in
the adjudicatory process. When a judge instead of a jury makes a decision,
cases are more easily resolved by summary judgment and readily reviewed on
appeal. Lowering the deference in appellate review permits the higher court
to more easily correct decisions with which it disagrees.

3. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958; see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (overruling precedent permitting juries to
construe patent claims), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
4. Claim construction refers to the process of determining the literal scope of a
patentee’s rights.
5. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958.
6. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
7. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1391–92.
8. For a broader discussion of these new theories, see David L. Schwartz & Ted M.
Sichelman, Doctrinal Displacement (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1832705.
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Reallocating a doctrine to a judge does more than simply empower a
court to profoundly influence the importance of that doctrine—there are
further-reaching consequences. A change in the importance of a given
doctrine may lead to the decline of other, typically related, doctrines in the
same field of law. These “displaced” doctrines may have been extremely
important prior to being dislodged.
The theories of doctrinal reallocation and displacement explain the chain
reaction resulting in the demise of the doctrine of equivalents. Initially, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reshaped patent litigation in
Markman. There, it overruled previous precedent and held that claim
construction was an issue of law that should be exclusively examined by a
judge rather than a jury.9 Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit in Cybor Corp.
v. FAS Technologies ruled that claim construction should be reviewed by the
appellate court using the expansive de novo standard. 10 These decisions
triggered significant changes in patent litigation, not only in connection with
claim construction, but also with respect to the doctrine of equivalents.
Claim construction, which was significant but not critical before these
decisions, rapidly became the centerpiece of patent litigation. Nearly
contemporaneously, the doctrine of equivalents declined in importance. In
effect, these doctrines switched places in terms of significance as a judicial
tool. This switch occurred, in part, because both doctrines are essentially
substitute ways for the court to evaluate the proper reach of an invention.
When one means of evaluating scope—claim construction—became
relatively easier for the court to apply, courts began to rely upon it more. As
a result of this shift, patent litigation today is far different than litigation in
the early 1990s.
The purpose of this Article is two-fold. Testing the theories of doctrinal
reallocation and doctrinal displacement, the Article first presents evidence
that doctrinal reallocation occurred in patent litigation in the wake of
Markman. In the aftermath of that reallocation, the Federal Circuit increased
the importance of claim construction in patent litigation. This observation,
based in part on empirical data, highlights the ability of the court to shape
patent law after reallocating the responsibility for claim construction to the
judge.

9. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 978; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (overruling precedent permitting juries to construe
patent claims), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
10. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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Second, the Article examines the demise of the doctrine of equivalents in
the lens of doctrinal displacement. 11 Specifically, this Article provides
empirical evidence showing that the rise in the importance of claim
construction foreshadowed a sharp decline in the importance of the doctrine
of equivalents. Reducing the significance of the doctrine of equivalents was
in line with the Federal Circuit’s goal of curbing the unpredictability of patent
jury trials.
This Article has four additional Parts. Part II explains the theory of
doctrinal reallocation and displacement in the context of adjustments to
claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents by the Federal Circuit.
Part III describes the empirical study design and methodology. Part IV
propounds hypotheses about the expected effect of Markman and Cybor on
patent litigation and the expected demise of the doctrine of equivalents. It
also delivers empirical results relating to the displacement of the doctrine of
equivalents in patent law. Part V concludes with some brief remarks about
the significance of the findings.
II.

THEORY

Doctrinal reallocation12 and doctrinal displacement13 may occur in almost
any area of law. Scholars have recognized that a shift in decision-making
authority from jury to judge (and vice-versa) can alter substantive doctrine,14
but they have yet to provide a formal theory to explain this jurisprudential
phenomenon. This Article provides such a theory and tests it with data in the
11. Although the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction both affect the
ultimate reach of a given patent claim, they are separate doctrines. See Tate Access Floors,
Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The doctrine
of equivalents expands the reach of claims beyond their literal language.”). However, others
have noted that the doctrine of equivalents and claim construction overlap. See, e.g., Kevin
Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing
Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2008) (arguing that courts at
times allow literal claim scope to grow to encompass after arising technologies, a task
traditionally performed by the doctrine of equivalents).
12. Doctrinal reallocation refers to reallocating the responsible decision-maker for a
doctrine. It is a loose analogy to asset reallocation. In asset reallocation, a portfolio is
adjusted among different asset classes to reduce risk.
13. Doctrinal displacement refers to displacing one doctrine with another. See infra
Section II.B.
14. For a review of the history of legal realists and their views on procedure, see NEIL
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 55–169 (1995); see also Frank B.
Cross, Legal Process, Legal Realism and the Strategic Political Effects of Procedural Rules 2 (Univ. of
Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 065, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=837665 (“Realists argue that the apparently neutral procedural requirements are
created or applied precisely for their ideological implications.”).
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context of the Federal Circuit, which reviews nearly all appeals involving
issues of patent law. 15 This Part briefly explains the theories of doctrinal
reallocation and doctrinal displacement using two doctrines from patent law:
claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents.
A.

DOCTRINAL REALLOCATION AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

There are many reasons why a court may wish to increase the importance
of a doctrine. Typically the change is made because the court wants to
implement an institutional preference. These institutional preferences often
are designed to reduce the uncertainty of litigation outcomes—in other
words, courts aim to improve the predictability and stability of the
adjudicatory process. Separately, courts are worried about institutional
legitimacy and fairness. Alternatively, courts may have concerns about
excessive caseloads, and they raise the significance of a doctrine to permit
swifter resolution of lawsuits.
Before discussing the theory in detail, several terms must be defined.
First, this Article uses “importance” of a doctrine to mean how central a
doctrine is to an area of law, including, for example, how often it is raised
and how often it is dispositive of the entire dispute. 16 Second, “control”
refers to the ability of judges to determine the importance of a doctrine not
just for a given case, but for an area of law as a whole. The importance of the
doctrine may change with or without changing the substance of the
underlying law.
Any court can alter the importance of a doctrine by various procedural
mechanisms. Through these procedural mechanisms, examples of which are
described infra, district and appellate judges can change the quantum of their
control over the doctrine. One final note about jurisprudential control is
appropriate. Increased control over a doctrine does not always lead to the
doctrine becoming more important. Rather, control provides courts with the
ability to make the doctrine more or less important. The direction of
importance, either increased or decreased, is typically dictated by the court’s
overall institutional goal. If the goal is to lighten judicial workload, for
example, the court may increase the importance of a statute of limitations.
Alternatively, if the goal is to heighten predictability, the court may decrease
the importance of an unstructured jury doctrine.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002).
16. This Article analyzes various aspects of judicial decisions to evaluate importance,
necessarily making the assumption that these decisions are a good measure of the centrality
of an issue to the universe of disputes including unlitigated disputes.
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Judges can increase or decrease their control over a doctrine in several
fashions. One method is to “reallocate” the decision-making authority over a
particular doctrine among various institutional actors. “Horizontal”
reallocation refers to shifts of authority within the trial court—for example,
between the judge and jury. “Vertical” reallocation refers to shifts of
authority between upper and lower courts—for instance, by changing the
standard of review on appeal. Horizontal reallocation and vertical
reallocation are depicted in the two-by-two matrix shown in Figure 1, infra.17

Vertical Reallocation

Figure 1: Horizontal and Vertical Reallocation

Decision-maker: Jury
Std of Review: de novo

Decision-maker: Judge
Std of Review: de novo

Decision-maker: Jury
Std of Review: deferential

Decision-maker: Judge
Std of Review: deferential

Horizontal Reallocation

Within the trial court, decision-making responsibility is divided between
the jury and the judge. In Figure 1, judges have more control when the
district court judges are the decision-makers (shown on the right) than when
the juries are the decision-makers (shown on the left). 18 Horizontal
reallocation alters the control over the shifted issue. Judicial determination of
an issue provides more control to judges. Judges are repeat players in
litigation and hear the same issue more than a jury selected and seated for a
single case. Of course, the Seventh Amendment bounds horizontal

17. To fit reallocation into a simple two-by-two matrix, all deferential standards of
review are denoted as the same. In reality, there is a difference between the types of
deferential review such as substantial evidence and clear error. E.g., Frank B. Cross,
Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1502–03 (2003).
18. Changing the decision-maker on an issue between judge and jury is not a
substantive doctrinal shift per se. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal
Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 517 (2006) (noting that doctrine comprises “[j]udicial
opinions [that] create the rules or standards”). The underlying substantive doctrine on the
shifted issue remains unchanged. In other words, the rules or standards are unchanged; it is
the evaluator of these rules or standards who changes.
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reallocation, and more specifically, the extent to which issues may be recalled
from the jury.19
Vertical reallocation involves control within the hierarchy of the judicial
system, namely between lower courts and upper courts. Not all aspects of a
trial court judgment are reviewed on appeal with the same scrutiny. Courts
use the standard of review to differentiate among the various appealed
matters.20 The most permissive standard of review from the perspective of a
higher court—de novo—permits the upper court to review the matter
without deference.21 De novo (shown on the top in Figure 1) provides the
most control for the higher court because it can freely revise findings from
the court below. 22 Other standards of review such as clearly erroneous or
abuse of discretion (shown on the bottom in Figure 1) provide more control
to the lower court because the upper court cannot modify the lower
decisions unless there is clear error.
1. The Claim Construction Doctrine
In the mid-1990s, the Federal Circuit desired to make patent law more
predictable.23 Consequently, this Article argues, the Federal Circuit elevated
the importance of one aspect of patent litigation: claim construction. Claim
construction refers to the process of determining the literal scope of a

19. The Seventh Amendment states: “In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
20. Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 233, 240 (2009) (“If appellate courts examine all of the decisions made below
without any deference to rulings, then the trial court’s proceedings are meaningless.
However, a deferential standard of review not only works to preserve the integrity of the
trial court, it also serves to protect the appellate court’s valuable time and resources.”).
21. Id. at 246 (“Courts using de novo review examine the trial court’s application of the
law without affording the lower court discretion.”).
22. Admittedly, very little if anything falls within the top-left box.
23. See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1994) (“I therefore argue that
our court works best when it so defines generic legal rights that, in most individual
situations, the parties to a potential lawsuit could, if willing, reason together and agree on the
likely outcome of prospective litigation. Specifically, the parties’ lawyers could reliably predict
how our court would ultimately rule on the matter in dispute. Surely, moving in the opposite
direction—toward more uncertainty of rights, more unpredictability of adjudicatory
outcomes, and therefore more lawsuits—is an undesirable and ultimately an unsustainable
result.”). Obviously, there are limits to how predictable patent law can be, especially given
that it must apply to currently undiscovered technologies.
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patentee’s rights.24 The word “construction” in claim construction refers to
interpreting the meaning of the words used in a patent claim. 25 Claim
construction occurs in various contexts, and perhaps most prominently in
litigation.26
The law of claim construction is embodied in a series of canons of
construction, which are similar to the canons of statutory construction.27 The
Federal Circuit believed that claim construction was key to making patent law

24. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“ ‘Claim
construction’ is for the purpose of explaining and defining terms in the claims, and usually
requires use of words other than the words that are being defined.”). The word “claim” in
claim construction refers to the claims of the patent. All patents contain at least one and
typically multiple claims. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 103 (2002) (reporting that a random sample of
patents issued between 1996 and 1998 had an average of 14.87 claims per patent). The
claims are each a single sentence written in a technical manner. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 706.03(d) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). The U.S. Patent Office (Patent
Office) has detailed formatting and structural rules that apply to claims. Id. §§ 608.01(i)–
.01(o). The exact language in the claims is carefully considered by patent attorneys and the
Patent Office. Patent attorneys spend substantial time selecting the language to use in patent
claims. Jason M. Okun, To Thine Own Claim Be True: The Federal Circuit Disaster in Exxon
Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2000) (“It is in
the process of drafting the claim that the most crucial and close communication occurs
between the claim drafter and the inventor.”). The Patent Office substantively examines a
patent application to confirm that it meets the requirements for a patent (including utility,
patentable subject matter, novelty, non-obviousness, written description, enablement, and
best mode). During examination, the Patent Office considers the precise claim language
chosen by the patent applicant. The claims define the outer limit of the patentee’s rights. 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2006); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719,
731 (2009) (“[C]laiming communicates the set to the public to encourage efficient
investment in the invention, by requiring licensing or abstinence from the set’s embodiment
and by permitting free use of embodiments not in the set.”).
25. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse
claim language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the
claims.”).
26. In litigation, it is common for the parties to disagree on the meaning of a particular
word or phrase used in a patent claim. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign
Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1751 (2009) (“[T]here is
essentially always a dispute over the meaning of the patent claims.”).
27. KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK, PATENT
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 287–311 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing canons of claim
construction); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 144–45 (2005); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1047
n.43 (2003) (“Like canons of statutory construction, canons of claim construction assist the
court in interpreting language consistently.”).
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more predictable. 28 If companies know ex ante whether their activities
infringe on the rights of another, they can plan accordingly. 29 They can
rationally decide whether or not to engage in an activity after evaluating the
risks. 30 They can invest in “design around” solutions that add to the
storehouse of available technologies. A lack of predictability results in
companies not knowing with reasonable certainty whether their activities
infringe upon the rights of another, 31 which limits their ability to avoid
infringement in the first place.32 This uncertainty arguably leads to a loss of
efficiency, because some companies may avoid making new products
altogether to eliminate the risk of liability, or pay damages unnecessarily
when they otherwise could have designed to avoid infringement. 33 To
alleviate this problem, in the mid-1990s the Federal Circuit focused on
making patent law more efficient and predictable; to do so, this Article
argues, the Federal Circuit decided to make claim construction more
important.34
It is interesting that the Federal Circuit focused on claim construction as
a means of introducing greater certainty. This may have been because claim
construction serves a gatekeeper function in infringement suits: before
infringement may be determined, the claim must first be construed. 35
Furthermore, many invalidity defenses require claim construction as a first
step. Examples include whether the invention is novel, 36 obvious, 37 or
patentable subject matter.38 As a result, claim construction affects a variety of
other issues, especially those decided much later in the case. In other words,
28. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader,
J., dissenting in part) (“By removing lay juries from complex technological decisions, these
decisions promised to improve the predictability and uniformity of patent law.”).
29. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 46–48 (2008).
30. See id. at 6–8.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 70–72.
33. Id.
34. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774–75
(2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has used formalism in an effort to make patent law
more certain and predictable).
35. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In
determination of patent infringement, as the first step the claims are construed; then, the
construed claims are compared to the alleged infringing device.”).
36. Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The first step
of an anticipation analysis is claim construction.”).
37. E.g., Sys. Div., Inc. v. Teknek LLC, 59 F. App’x 333, 338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999))
(“The first step in an obviousness analysis is to construe the language of the claims.”).
38. See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1361, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (construing patent
claims before considering whether the claims were patentable subject matter).
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a change in the salience of claim construction may impact issues decided
after and reliant upon claim construction.39
2. Reallocation of the Claim Construction Doctrine
In the early 1990s, claim construction was largely performed by juries.40
Using jury instructions, the judge would instruct the jury on the tools to
determine the proper claim construction. 41 The judge would include
information on the canons of claim construction, but the jury would be
responsible for applying the canons. The judge still maintained some
modicum of control through post-trial motions42: if the judge believed that
the jury’s verdict was unsupported or in substantial error, the judge could
always grant judgment as a matter of law.43
Figure 2 illustrates the status of claim construction in the early 1990s,
prior to Markman and Cybor.

39. The Federal Circuit initially focused on claim construction rather than the doctrine
of equivalents to increase predictability. Claim construction is largely based upon the “four
corners” of the patent (and the associated prosecution history). In contrast, the doctrine of
equivalents is based on a variety of factors, including the patent, prosecution history, and the
operation and structure of the accused device. The court must have believed that it could
more easily use claim construction to arrive at definite and foreseeable results.
40. Edmund J. Sease, Markman Misses the Mark, Miserably, 2004 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 99,
101 (“The jury was allowed to hear all the evidence and then decide what the term
‘absorbent’ meant factually in the context of the invention. This was the state of the Federal
Circuit in 1984. . . . Since Markman in 1996, juries are no longer allowed to determine the
meaning of a patent claim.”).
41. See, e.g., U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(recounting detailed jury instructions provided to construe a means-plus-function claim
limitation).
42. In fact, in the famous Markman case, the trial judge entered judgment as a matter of
law for the accused infringer after the jury had found for the patentee. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
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Figure 2: Claim Construction in the Early 1990s

Decision-maker: Jury
Std of Review: de novo

Decision-maker: Judge
Std of Review: de novo

Decision-maker: Jury
Std of Review: deferential

Decision-maker: Judge
Std of Review: deferential

Claim construction—
early 1990s
Horizontal Reallocation

Figure 2 places claim construction in the early 1990s as a doctrine
evaluated by the jury and reviewed on appeal with some deference. However,
the figure slightly oversimplifies the state of patent litigation, for even in the
early 1990s, district court judges interpreted claims in some instances.44 For
example, district court judges granted summary judgment in some patent
cases. 45 To decide summary judgment, the court construed the claims and
compared the properly construed claims to the accused product or method,
granting all inferences to the non-moving party. 46 Judges also construed
patent claims when deciding motions for preliminary injunctions, a form of
equitable relief reserved only for the court. 47 Moreover, judges conducted
bench trials of patent cases without a jury demand, and in doing so construed
patent claims.48 But, in general, in the early 1990s, claim construction was the
province of the jury.49

44. It should be noted that before the late 1980s, there were fewer jury demands and
most patent cases were bench trials. See Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 850–51, 851 fig.1 (2002).
45. See, e.g., Int’l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg., 991 F.2d 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
46. See, e.g., UTStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks, Corp., No. 07-CV-2582, 2009 WL
3122554, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2009) (“At the summary judgment stage, the accused
device is compared to the construed claims to determine whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact.”).
47. See, e.g., Devon Indus., Inc. v. Am. Med. Mfg., 19 F.3d 39 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Al-Site
Corp. v. Cable Car Sunglasses, 911 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
48. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores, 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
49. Jeffrey Peabody, Under Construction: Towards a More Deferential Standard of Review in
Claim Construction Cases, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 505, 506 (2008) (“Prior to 1995, claim construction
issues were typically decided by the jury.”).
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At a recent conference, Federal Circuit Judge Jay Plager revealed some
information about the Federal Circuit’s thinking about claim construction
just before the mid-1990s.50 According to Judge Plager, the Federal Circuit
was concerned about the lack of transparency and the “black box” nature of
the jury process, particularly with regards to claim construction. To reverse
this problem, the Federal Circuit made major changes in the process of claim
construction between 1995 and 1998. None of the changes affected the
substantive claim construction doctrine. Instead, the Federal Circuit
reallocated the responsibility for claim construction that had rested in juries
entirely to judges. The reason for this reallocation can be gleaned from the
judicial opinions themselves. The Federal Circuit held that “it is only
fair . . . that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope
of the patentee’s right to exclude.”51 The Federal Circuit further stated that
“competitors should be able to rest assured . . . that a judge, trained in the law,
will . . . apply the established rules of construction, and in that way arrive at
the true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights to be given legal
effect.”52
Horizontal and vertical reallocation in patent law began in April 1995
when the Federal Circuit issued its en banc decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments (Markman I). 53 Markman I held that claim construction was
exclusively reserved for the judge. 54 The majority acknowledged that there
were two lines of cases in the Federal Circuit claim construction precedent,
one holding that “claim construction may have underlying factual inquiries
that must be submitted to a jury,” 55 and the second holding that claim
construction “is strictly a question of law for the court.” 56 The Federal
Circuit found that the first line was incorrect and should be abandoned
because it had no firm basis in Federal Circuit precedent. 57 The Federal

50. Judge S. Jay Plager, Comments at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Symposium: The Federal Circuit as an Institution (Oct. 30, 2009).
51. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
52. Id. at 979 (emphasis added). To be fair, the Federal Circuit is not a single
monolithic court. For example, there were three judges who declined to join in the Markman
majority, Judges Mayer and Rader (concurring) and Judge Newman (dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 979 (“We therefore settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that in a
case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the
meaning of language used in the patent claim.”).
55. Id. at 976.
56. Id. at 976–77.
57. Id. at 977–78.
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Circuit also found that claim construction must be reviewed de novo when
raised in an appeal.58
The next year, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal
Circuit’s Markman I holding, but on somewhat different reasoning (Markman
II). 59 The Supreme Court supported the Federal Circuit, stating that claim
construction is “exclusively within the province of the court.” 60 After
deciding that no Supreme Court precedent controlled the issue, the Court
decided to “consider both the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries
and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation.” 61
According to the Supreme Court, judges are more likely to properly construe
a written instrument.62
While the Supreme Court in Markman II upheld that judges must
construe claims (horizontal reallocation), it was silent on the standard of
review of claim construction rulings (vertical reallocation). This silence by the
Supreme Court led to some short term uncertainty with respect to the
standard of review of claim construction. Markman I held that it was to be
reviewed de novo. 63 Markman II was silent on this point. 64 Nonetheless, a
majority of Federal Circuit claim construction opinions after Markman II
found that claim construction was to be reviewed de novo. 65 However, a
minority of cases concluded that there was a factual component to claim
construction, and those facts were reviewed with deference.66
In 1998, several years after Markman II, the Federal Circuit en banc
decided Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, which resolved the standard of review
issue.67 In Cybor, the Federal Circuit held that claim construction is purely a
matter of law and should be reviewed de novo on appeal. The Federal Circuit
stated that most panels after Markman II had followed the de novo

58. Id. at 979.
59. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I ), 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
60. Id. at 372.
61. Id. at 384.
62. Id. at 388–89.
63. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 975.
64. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370.
65. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Gen. Am.
Transp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
66. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547,
1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Metaulics Sys. Co. v.
Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
67. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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standard.68 The Federal Circuit rejected the clearly erroneous standard.69 Just
as shifting the decision from jury to judge horizontally reallocated control to
the judges, shifting the standard of review from deference to de novo
vertically reallocated control from the trial courts to the appellate courts.
Patent litigation after Markman and Cybor is represented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Claim Construction After Markman and Cybor

Vertical Reallocation

Decision-maker: Jury
Std of Review: de novo

Decision-maker: Judge
Std of Review: de novo

Cybor —1998
Decision-maker: Jury
Std of Review: deferential

Decision-maker: Judge
Std of Review: deferential

Claim construction—
early 1990s

Markman —1995/1996

Horizontal Reallocation

Figure 3 makes apparent the quick change in claim construction control.
Within a three-year window, the Federal Circuit moved claim construction
from the bottom left box in the matrix—weakest control by the court—to
the top right box—greatest control by the court. Markman I clearly brought
horizontal reallocation of claim construction,70 moving it from the left box to
the right box. A move in this direction gave trial court judges more control
of the claim construction doctrine.71 Cybor resulted in vertical reallocation, as
is evidenced by moving upward on the matrix as shown in Figure 3.72 By

68. Id. at 1454.
69. Id.
70. The Federal Circuit’s 1995 en banc ruling reallocated the decision-maker for claim
construction. The Supreme Court’s decision merely affirmed. Consequently, the 1995 date is
used as the date of reallocation in this Article.
71. It also should be noted that Figure 2 is an oversimplification. As noted by the
Federal Circuit in Markman I, there was a split in authority before 1995. Some cases before
Markman I had held that claim construction was for the judge. So while all of the postMarkman cases fall on the right side of Figure 3, a majority but not all of the pre-Markman
cases fall on the left side.
72. Markman I also brought vertical reallocation to claim construction. However,
Markman II created some uncertainty on the effectiveness of that reallocation. See supra note
66 and accompanying text. Cybor confirmed it.
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using both horizontal and vertical reallocation, the Federal Circuit seized
maximum control over the claim construction doctrine.73
B.

DOCTRINAL DISPLACEMENT IN PATENT LAW

Doctrinal reallocation generally results in elevating or diminishing the
importance of a given doctrine. In turn, after one doctrine increases in
importance, one or more other doctrines generally decrease in importance—
in other words, they are “displaced” by the doctrine that became more
prominent.74
1. Causes of Doctrinal Displacement
There are three major causes of doctrinal displacement. First, there is a
practical explanation: litigation constraints. Early in the life of a lawsuit, many
claims and defenses are raised. After discovery progresses, the parties have an
opportunity to explore the merits and strengths of their respective cases.
Later, at critical moments in the lawsuit—for example, summary judgment,
trial, and appeal—the parties typically focus their claims and defenses.
Litigants understand that their chances of success increase if they focus their
arguments on a few winnable points.75 Raising multiple, weaker arguments
dilutes the strength of the promising ones.76 Word and page limits further

73. Figure 3 is a useful illustration of the changes occurring in the mid-1990s.
However, the two-by-two matrix has a few limitations. For the purposes of illustration, each
time period has been placed in a single box. As noted above, there were some Federal
Circuit opinions in the early 1990s that reviewed claim construction de novo. See, e.g., Oscar
Mayer Foods Corp. v. ConAgra Inc., 45 F.3d 443 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (unpublished table
decision). And after Markman II in 1996, most but not all of the Federal Circuit panels
considered claim construction using the de novo standard. A very few cases were tried to
juries before Markman I and decided on appeal after Markman II. For example, in B. Braun
Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, the entire case was submitted to a jury in 1994. 124 F.3d
1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The case was not decided by the Federal Circuit until 1997. Id. Almost
all jury claim constructions had been settled or resolved by Markman II. Thus, perhaps
Markman and Cybor should be considered together. Using this understanding, most of the
cases after Markman II should be in the upper right box like those emphasized in Figure 3.
74. The corollary is that as one doctrine becomes less important, one or more other
doctrines are usually enhanced.
75. Stephen Easton, Losing Your Appeal, 42 FED. LAW. 24, 31 (1995) (directing
appellants to “choose the arguments that give you your best chances for success. Force
yourself to pare the list to two or three strong grounds for reversal (or affirmance).
Concentrate on them in both the briefs and the oral argument”).
76. Id. at 31 (“An attorney who swamps a judge with every possible argument runs the
risk of causing the judge to miss the best arguments. If you throw a diamond into a mud
pile, it starts to look pretty muddy.”).
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push the parties to focus their claims and defenses.77 Parties to an appeal are
capped on the number of words permitted in the documents they submit to
the court, and many district courts impose page limits on summary judgment
or other important briefs. Litigation constraints are driven by the strategic
decisions by the lawyers of which issues to develop and press.78
When evaluating which issues to raise, litigants weigh at least two
strategic considerations. First, litigants consider the likelihood of success on
the merits of a given issue. Second, litigants consider whether the judge or
jury will find the issue important in the context of the overall dispute. When
one doctrine becomes more important, and consequently is raised more
frequently, other doctrines will be raised less frequently. This displacement of
other doctrines is normally diffuse. In each case, depending on the particular
facts and circumstances, a different doctrine may be displaced. Alternatively,
no doctrine may be displaced, and instead litigants may expand the force with
which they argue a more limited number of points. Over a series of cases, no
single doctrine is displaced directly. In these instances, multiple doctrines are
displaced to a lesser degree, and the displacement proceeds largely unnoticed.
However, the court can focus the displacement on one or several doctrines
through additional case law. En banc decisions of an appellate court (or
decisions of the Supreme Court) are particularly useful to displace a single
doctrine.
The litigation constraints rationale may be particularly important with
claim construction. In patent infringement lawsuits, there are frequently
numerous potential claim construction disputes. As claim construction
became more likely to be a critical and winnable issue, litigants often devoted
several of their limited number of arguments to claim construction disputes.
Devoting more to claim construction left far less room for other arguments
and doctrines, thereby enhancing the displacement of other doctrines.
A second reason for doctrinal displacement is judicial constraints.
District court judges have limited time and resources and, when appropriate,
rely on summary judgment to expeditiously resolve lawsuits. When summary
judgment is available on several possible grounds, judges frequently select the
“cheapest” basis. The cheapest option expends the least judicial time or
effort. When one doctrine is increased in importance, the time and effort for
the judge to consider the various summary judgment avenues change. In
77. Id. (“In almost every appellate case, the length of the briefs, the time for oral
argument, and, most importantly, the attention spans of judges with overloaded dockets are
all severely limited.”).
78. As litigation tactics, they are subject to “selection effects” in that displacement may
affect which cases settle and do not result in a written opinion.
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patent law, after judges construe claims, they can, for instance, evaluate
summary judgment on either non-infringement or invalidity. Noninfringement is typically easier for the judge because there is often a single
accused product to evaluate, in contrast with a more complicated analysis of
multiple pieces of prior art under, for example, the obviousness doctrine.
Furthermore, the judge may already be familiar with the accused product
from the claim construction process. 79 Thus, judicial claim construction
lowers the adjudicative cost of non-infringement relative to other defenses.
For these reasons, non-infringement is commonly the preferred route to
dispose of patent cases. Non-infringement and invalidity are not substitute
doctrines. However, they are substitute methods of resolving cases.
Moreover, even outside of the summary judgment context, judges may
strategically choose which doctrine to use to dispose of the case. In situations
in which the standard of review differs for the two doctrines, district court
judges may rely upon the doctrine afforded more deference on appeal to
reduce the risk of reversal.80
Other academic literature supports the view that courts behave
strategically in response to systemic changes to patent litigation. Professors
Matthew Henry and John Turner studied the impact of the creation of the
Federal Circuit on patent litigation.81 They conducted a time-series analysis of
decisions from 1953 until 2002. 82 According to Henry and Turner, the
Federal Circuit, which was created in 1982, was substantially less likely to find
a patent invalid than its predecessor courts.83 If a district court judge found a
patent invalid, the Federal Circuit was more likely to reverse than the regional
circuit courts had been. Henry and Turner assert that, because the tendency

79. There is some case law stating that the accused product is legally irrelevant to claim
construction. See, e.g., SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (en banc) (stating that a claim is not to be construed in light of the accused device).
Other cases expressly permit viewing the accused product to provide further context for the
claim construction analysis. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.,
442 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
80. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (2007)
(finding evidence that trial judges choose the bases for their sentencing decisions to protect
their decision from higher court review); Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of
Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002) (finding support that
strategic considerations influence trial courts when reviewing decision from the
Environmental Protection Agency).
81. Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85 (2006).
82. Id. at 88–89.
83. Id. at 90.
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to reverse invalidity findings was well-known, district courts more frequently
relied on non-infringement to resolve cases after 1982.84
There is a third explanation for doctrinal displacement: the judge’s role as
a gatekeeper. In some instances, such as in claim construction after Markman,
the judge must decide one doctrine before reaching others. These
downstream doctrines can include doctrines relating to liability and damages.
If the judge decides the first doctrine in a manner that resolves the dispute,
the second doctrine need not be reached. For instance, assume that the
decision-maker for the duty of reasonable care requirement in tort law was
shifted from the jury to the judge. Thereafter, judges if they so desired could
dispose of negligence actions without a jury trial on the basis that no duty
was owed to the defendant. In this example, the doctrines of negligence and
damages could be displaced due to the judge’s gatekeeping role.
The gatekeeper theory permits extreme displacement of a doctrine. The
displaced doctrine does not merely fall incrementally in the hierarchy of
doctrines. A slight decrease would be consistent with the litigation
constraints theory alone; rather, the gatekeeper theory adds that the doctrine
drops substantially. A reallocation can drop another previously important
doctrine below numerous other unaffected doctrines. And substitute
doctrines that address the same equity concerns are strong candidates for
displacement. When one doctrine becomes more prominent, the court can
use it extensively. Substitute doctrines are not needed as much, and
subsequently diminish in stature.
Doctrinal displacement may also be enhanced with the rise in summary
judgment of another doctrine. If summary judgment is granted for the
defendant on a particular defense, no jury trial may be necessary in the case.
Doctrines which would have been evaluated by the jury become moot. Thus,
increasing the grants of summary judgment has the effect of displacing
doctrines typically considered by the jury downstream of the summary
judgment decision.
The litigation constraints, judicial constraints, and gatekeeper
explanations for doctrinal displacement are interrelated. When litigants know
that the court acts as a gatekeeper before a doctrine is reached, they are more
likely to downplay it. Instead, litigants focus their primary efforts on the
gatekeeping doctrine. Similarly, when litigants understand that courts prefer
to grant summary judgment on a particular basis, they are likely to file
motions on that basis more often. Consequently, litigation realities amplify

84. Id. at 103.
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the effect of the gatekeeper. As such, all three theories support the same
result—the displacement of one doctrine as another gains importance.85
2. The Displaced Doctrine: The Doctrine of Equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents permits a finding of infringement even if the
accused device or method does not literally fall within the scope of the
construed patent claims.86 Instead, a device or method may infringe under
the doctrine of equivalents if it performs “substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the patented
invention.87 Thus, the doctrine of equivalents permits an expansion of patent
rights beyond the literal scope of the patent claims. One purpose of the
doctrine of equivalents is to protect patentees from those who seek “to evade
liability for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented
invention.” 88 The Supreme Court explained that without the doctrine of
equivalents, a patent would be “a hollow and useless thing” and
“unscrupulous copyist[s]” would be “encourage[d].” 89 At the onset of
litigation, most patentees allege infringement both literally and under the
doctrine of equivalents, with the latter being a fallback position.90
The Federal Circuit endorsed the doctrine of equivalents in 1995, nearly
simultaneously with the claim construction reallocation resulting from
Markman. In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., the Federal
Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed a jury verdict of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.91 In a 7–5 ruling, the majority held that an exception
to the doctrine of equivalents known as prosecution history estoppel did not
apply. 92 The Federal Circuit also declined to reallocate the doctrine of
equivalents to the judge, instead holding that the doctrine of equivalents was

85. An important question is whether displacement is intentional or an unintended
consequence. This Article cannot answer that question with any certainty. However, the fact
that no court has acknowledged displacement leads me to believe it is unintentional.
86. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39–40 (1997).
87. Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1992)). An accepted alternative test for
the doctrine of equivalents is whether there are insubstantial differences between the accused
device or method and the claimed invention. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 24. Another
relevant consideration is the known interchangeability of the elements.
88. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002).
89. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
90. Allison et al., supra note 2, at 977. (“Rather, a patentee is almost always arguing the
doctrine of equivalents as an alternative to a theory of literal infringement.”).
91. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1528–29 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
92. Id. at 1514.
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a jury question.93 In the years that followed, first the Supreme Court and then
the Federal Circuit began limiting the reach of the doctrine of equivalents.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
issued several significant decisions involving the doctrine of equivalents. 94
These cases, in turn, placed legal limits—administered by judges—on when
the doctrine of equivalents is applicable. First, in 1997, the Supreme Court
decided Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis, which reversed the Federal Circuit’s
en banc decision.95 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court held that the All
Element Rules must be employed,96 meaning that each claim element must
be present in the accused device or method either literally or equivalently.97
Prior to this Supreme Court opinion, the Federal Circuit had not consistently
and stringently applied the All Elements Rule, and sometimes it permitted
patentees to loosely argue that the accused product was equivalent to the
invention as a whole.98
Thereafter, in 2000, the Federal Circuit en banc voted in Festo v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. to bar the application of the doctrine of
equivalents for certain claim elements.99 The Federal Circuit found that the
doctrine of equivalents was not available if a claim element had been
amended during the process of examination by the Patent Office. 100
93. Id. at 1522 (“In answer to the second question posed by this court en banc,
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury
in a jury trial with proper instructions, and to be decided by the judge in a bench trial.”).
94. For a good discussion of the development of the doctrine of equivalents during
this time frame, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123,
164–69 (2005); Michael Meurer & Craig A. Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope:
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005); Petherbridge, Doctrine
of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1385–1393.
95. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
96. Id. at 40 (“The determination of equivalence should be applied as an objective
inquiry on an element-by-element basis.”).
97. Id. at 21 (“Nearly 50 years ago, this Court in [Graver Tank] . . . set out the modern
contours of what is known in patent law as the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’ Under this doctrine,
a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim
may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the
accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”).
98. Cf. Joseph R. Re & Lynda J. Zadra-Symes, Infringement Under the Doctrine of
Equivalents: The Federal Circuit’s First Ten Years, 785 ALI-ABA PAT. L. & LITIG. 77, 93 (1992)
(“The Federal Circuit has applied the element-by-element approach it adopted in banc in
Pennwalt [in 1987] almost consistently since that decision.”).
99. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
100. Id. at 563 (“Therefore, an amendment that narrows the scope of a claim for any
reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history
estoppel with respect to the amended claim element.”).
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Specifically, if the patentee had amended a particular element for “reasons
relating to patentability”—such as to convince the Patent Office that the
claim was new—then no equivalence was available for such element.101 After
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court in 2002 rejected the Federal Circuit’s
categorical test. 102 Instead, the Supreme Court held that a rebuttable
presumption applies to any claim amended for reasons relating to
patentability. 103 However, the Supreme Court’s flexible and rebuttable
presumption approach has been very difficult for patentees to overcome.104
Thus, while the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid test, the
effect of these rulings has been a substantial reduction in instances in which
the doctrine of equivalents is applicable.105
In sum, the doctrine of equivalents, a fairness doctrine juries apply, is
arguably inconsistent with a patent system premised on predictability and on
clear prior notice of the scope of rights.106 In the years since Markman, there
have been several Federal Circuit and Supreme Court cases touching on the
doctrine of equivalents. These cases introduced substantive restrictions on
101. Id. at 569 (“When a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with
regard to a claim element, there is no range of equivalents available for the amended claim
element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is completely barred
(a ‘complete bar’).”).
102. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 723–25
(2002).
103. Id. at 741 (“When the patentee has chosen to narrow a claim, courts may presume
the amended text was composed with awareness of this rule and that the territory
surrendered is not an equivalent of the territory claimed. In those instances, however, the
patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of equivalence. The
patentee must show that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the
alleged equivalent.”).
104. Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense to Willful Patent
Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A Bridge or the Troubled Waters?, 5 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 210, 218 (2007) (“[W]hen a claim amendment is an amendment
related to patentability, there arises a presumption of estoppel against the doctrine of
equivalents, which presumption may only be overcome in a few ‘narrow ways.’ ”).
105. Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, “Vitiating” the Doctrine of Equivalents: A
New Patent Law Doctrine, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 457, 459 (2003) (“These other decisions, which
have become more and more frequent in the last few years, limit the DOE by effectively
creating a per se rule as to what constitutes an equivalent.”). In 2001, the Federal Circuit
continued narrowing the reach of the doctrine of equivalents. The Federal Circuit en banc
eliminated the doctrine of equivalents for a different type of claim element—no equivalents
are available for subject matter disclosed in a patent specification but not literally claimed.
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (2002) (en banc).
106. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 5 (2010) (“The express purpose of [the doctrine of equivalents] is to ensure fair
and adequate protection to the patentee and to solidify the patent incentive.”); cf. Meurer &
Nard, supra note 94, at 1953–54.
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the doctrine of equivalents.107 However, the displacement of the doctrine of
equivalents, which led to its decreasing importance, occurred after Markman
I, well before any direct assaults on the doctrine in these cases. For the most
part, these cases reduced the occasions on which a patentee may successfully
raise infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.108 But the displacement
had already occurred. While they surely further diminished the stature of the
doctrine, they occurred subsequent to the doctrinal displacement.
Other scholars have empirically studied the success of patentees who
attempt to rely upon the doctrine of equivalents, and their data supports the
theory that the doctrine of equivalents has diminished in several respects.
Petherbridge found that by 2007, patentees only rarely succeeded under the
doctrine of equivalents.109 Rather than tying the decrease in success to the
Markman decision, Petherbridge traces it to the Festo decision in 2000, which
provided strong limits on the availability of the doctrine of equivalents. 110
Petherbridge also posited that the decline in the doctrine of equivalents is
directly related to the rise in power of claim construction.111 As the Federal
Circuit increased its rate of modifying lower court claim constructions, it
decreased the rate of success of a patentee on the doctrine of equivalents.112
However, Petherbridge did not provide an explanation of why the increased
importance of claim construction decreased the success rate on the doctrine
of equivalents.113 Petherbridge, instead, argues that an intra-circuit dispute on

107. John R. Thomas, Claim Re-construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman
Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 159 (2005).
108. See Fromer, supra note 24, at 735–38; Nicole S. Robbins, The Curtailment of the
Doctrine of Equivalents: Courts Emphasize the Public Notice Function of Patent Claims, 35 SUFFOLK L.
REV. 323, 339–43 (2001).
109. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1386–92. From reviewing the
figures in Petherbridge’s articles, it appears that the decline did not commence until at least
Markman I.
110. Id. at 1390–92 (reporting that logistical regression predicts that changes in
procedural circumstances in the doctrine of equivalents largely explain the decline).
111. Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect, supra note 2, at 236.
112. Id. (“[R]egression analysis provides evidence that the Federal Circuit’s rejection of
lower court claim construction determinations most strongly predicts a decrease in
predictability, while other variables that could have explained it, like changes in the rules
surrounding the doctrine of equivalents have either no impact or predict predictability rather
than unpredictability.”).
113. In fact, Petherbridge argues that the procedural changes relating to claim
construction did not cause the decline in the doctrine of equivalents. See Petherbridge, Claim
Construction Effect, supra note 2, at 244 (“Procedural changes (e.g., increases in relative rates of
incoming summary judgments potentially wrought by the Markman/Cybor framework) do
not provide a strong explanation for the decline in doctrinal stability.”).
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claim construction methodology appeared around 2000, which affected the
doctrine of equivalents.114
Allison and Lemley draw somewhat different conclusions from their
empirical study of outcomes of doctrine of equivalents cases.115 They studied
district court and Federal Circuit doctrine of equivalents decisions in three
periods surrounding the Festo decision.116 Allison and Lemley assert that the
multiple substantive changes in the doctrine of equivalents law had
“surprisingly little effect on the actual outcome of doctrine of equivalents
cases.” 117 More significant to the present Article, Allison and Lemley state
that by the late 1990s, patentee assertions under the doctrine of equivalents
almost never prevailed at trial or on appeal.118
Allison and Lemley argue that Markman killed the doctrine of
equivalents.119 They speculate that after Markman, district court judges were
inclined to err on the side of granting summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents.120 There was rarely a dispute
about the structure or function of the accused product. So after the judge
construed the claims, summary judgment of literal infringement or noninfringement was often appropriate.121 But granting summary judgment of no
literal infringement would not resolve the entire lawsuit. To end the lawsuit,
the court had to consider the patentee’s charge of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 122 Allison and Lemley argue that judges “will be
doubly inclined to hold for the accused infringer” on the doctrine of
equivalents as the only way to dispose of the case.123 Allison and Lemley’s
explanation for the decline of the doctrine of equivalents is similar to the
gatekeeper theory for displacement, and their empirical results are consistent
with doctrinal displacement. However, their explanation is incomplete as
they focus only on the trial court, not the appellate court, as a gatekeeper.
They also do not fully articulate the litigation and judicial constraints aspects
of displacement.

114. Id. at 245 (“The evidence to this point suggests that [the change in the realm of
claim construction] more strongly involves changes in claim construction jurisprudence than
it does changes in the rules of the doctrine of equivalents.”).
115. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2.
116. Id. at 963–66.
117. Id. at 957.
118. See id. at 970–71.
119. See id. at 977–78.
120. See id. at 977.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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So why was the doctrine of equivalents displaced, and not some other
doctrine? One explanation is that claim construction and the doctrine of
equivalents serve similar functions—both are directed to the scope of
protection for a patentee. Claim construction provides the literal reach of the
patent. The doctrine of equivalents permits the patentee a further reach, as
long as the differences between the literal claim scope and the accused
product are insubstantial. When construing claims, the judge often knows the
structure of the accused products. Using this knowledge, the judge may
provide a broader construction to ambiguous claim language so as to avoid
confronting the doctrine of equivalents. In other words, courts may have
found these doctrines to be substitutes for each other. And as previously
noted, substitute doctrines are strong candidates for displacement.124
A related explanation is that claim construction has arguably expanded to
encompass the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents permits
the patentee to cover items that perform substantially the same function
although they have different structure. For instance, a stent with an oval
cross-section might be found equivalent to a claimed one with a “circular”
cross-section. After Markman I, claim construction is performed solely by
judges. Juries did not need to provide a written record of their claim
construction. Judges, when forced to do this, regularly defined the claim
terms—structural terms—using functional definitions.125 Post Markman I, the
judicial craft of claim construction has subsumed the doctrine of equivalents.
Consequently, the need for the doctrine of equivalents was effectively
eliminated.
As outlined above, Allison and Lemley provide a different reason for the
displacement of the doctrine of equivalents. After the judge steeped herself
in the technology and construed the claims, she was less inclined to submit
the case to a jury. 126 However, to fully resolve the case, the doctrine of
equivalents needed to be decided. 127 Thus, as a practical matter, judges
quickly decided the doctrine of equivalents under the guise of summary
judgment to keep the case from the jury.128 If this is true, one would expect
less success on the doctrine of equivalents after Markman hearings became
important.129 While Markman mandated that district court judges construe the

124. See supra Section II.B.1.
125. An exception to this is organic chemistry, a field in which structure can be defined
by structure alone.
126. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 977.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 977–98.
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patent claims, it left open when and how judges do so. Some courts adopted
local patent rules that specified the timing of claim construction. 130 Many
judges elected to hold separate hearings, often called Markman hearings.131
These hearings solely focused on the meaning of the claims, and they are
typically divorced from consideration of the issues of infringement, validity,
or enforceability. 132 Markman hearings could last up to several weeks and
sometimes included live witness testimony. Other judges elected to construe
the patent claims simultaneously with deciding dispositive motions. These
judges often did not hold a Markman hearing but, instead, decided the issue
of claim construction based on the written record developed during summary
judgment briefing. The Federal Circuit has taken no position on the timing
and procedure used by district courts to construe claims, and it has approved
of both major approaches.133 The sole Federal Circuit mandate was that claim
construction must be performed by the court, not the jury. 134 Judges who
held separate hearings may have been more likely to learn the technology and
have a greater desire to dispose of the case in its entirety after claim
construction. Because the substantive changes to the doctrine of equivalents
in Festo are so close in time to the rise of separate hearings, it would be
difficult to directly test whether the hearings are correlated with the
displacement.
III.

STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The findings of this Article are based upon data derived from three
databases: (1) a claim construction appellate decision database consisting of
information from all published and unpublished claim construction decisions
from 1991 until 2008; (2) an appellate issue database consisting of
information for all electronically available Federal Circuit decisions from the
130. See, e.g., N.D. CAL., P.R. 4-5, 4-6 (2010); E.D. TEX., P.R. 4-5, 4-6 (2010); N.D. GA.,
P.R. 6.5, 6.6 (2009); W.D. PA., P.R. 4 (2009); S.D. TEX., P.R. 4.5, 4.6 (2008); E.D. N.C., P.R.
304.5, 304.6 (2010).
131. William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the
Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 59 (1999).
132. See Sease, supra note 40, at 99.
133. The Federal Circuit has even authorized the court to conduct rolling claim
construction, revising an initial claim construction after the record was more fully developed.
See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“After discovery the court expects the parties to refine the disputed issues and learn more
about the claim terms and technology, at which point a more accurate claim construction
can be attempted.”).
134. Lee & Krug, supra note 131, at 56–57 (noting that Markman did not proscribe any
particular timing to claim construction, and further noting that district courts have construed
patent claims as early as the onset of litigation and as late as prior to jury instruction).
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years 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000; and (3) a word count appellate database
consisting of published appeals following grants of summary judgment from
1987 until 2004. The appellate issue and word count appellate databases were
created for this Article. This Part describes the databases and the process for
constructing them. It then discusses limitations of the study including
limitations of empirical legal studies of appellate court decisions more
generally.
A.

THE DATABASES
1. The Claim Construction Appellate Decision Database

The claim construction appellate decision database includes all claim
construction appellate decisions from district court litigation135 from January
1, 1991 until December 31, 2008. 136 Overall, the database contains 1,288
Federal Circuit decisions, including 157 decisions before Markman I. 137
Appeals are included regardless of the procedural posture—whether resolved
via preliminary injunction, summary judgment, trial, or otherwise. The
database only includes appeals from district courts. Accordingly, it does not
include appeals from the United States Patent & Trademark Office, the
Court of Federal Claims, or the International Trade Commission.
The claim construction appellate decision database includes all merits
resolutions by the Federal Circuit of claim construction appeals from district
court litigation. The Federal Circuit can resolve appeals involving claim
construction through several mechanisms including a precedential written
opinion, a non-precedential written opinion, and a summary affirmance. The
database includes precedential and non-precedential opinions, as well as
appeals resolved without a written opinion. A detailed explanation of how

135. The dataset only includes utility patents. Appellate review of claim construction of
design patents (and plant patents) is relatively infrequent. Because claim construction of
design patents is substantively different from claim construction of utility patents, design
(and plant) patents were excluded from the present study.
136. The claim construction appellate decision database has been used in several
previous studies. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 237–41 (2008) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect]; David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study
of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International
Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman
Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal
Rates].
137. The reliability and validity of the original database is high. See Schwartz, Practice
Makes Perfect, supra note 136, at 272–73.
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the original dataset was derived is available elsewhere 138 and consequently,
not repeated here.
2. The Appellate Issue Database
The appellate issue database identifies the issues discussed in Federal
Circuit decisions from the years 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000. The years were
selected to include equally spaced samples, before and after Markman I and
II.
The database records specific issues explored in all electronically-available
Federal Circuit opinions, both precedential and non-precedential, during
those years. The issues are generally identified by headings in the opinions
such as anticipation, obviousness, inequitable conduct, and infringement.
Most cases involved multiple issues. Claim construction may be analyzed as a
precursor to any of these issues. Even if the Federal Circuit’s analysis did not
use a heading, if the opinion discussed the issue, it was included in the
database. For claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents, an opinion
was not recorded unless there was a specific discussion in the opinion
analyzing the relevant law or facts.139 A bare bones recitation in an opinion,
such as one which notes that infringement was not shown literally or under
the doctrine of equivalents or that the court must construe the claims, was
not recorded.140
To develop the appellate issue database, a Lexis query was performed to
locate potentially relevant cases. 141 A human coder recorded the issues
138. For a thorough discussion of the selection, coding, and reliability of the dataset, see
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 136, at 269–74. For a discussion of particular issues
with locating earlier (pre-1995) cases, see Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note
136, at 1073, 1091–92.
139. Technically, claim construction is a doctrine, not an issue. See Tiller & Cross, supra
note 18 (discussing the distinction between doctrine and issue.) As for the doctrine of
equivalents, the Supreme Court itself uses the phrase “doctrine of equivalents.” In coding the
appellate issue database, claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents were included, in
addition to the general issues of §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112; literal infringement; and
inequitable conduct.
140. The Federal Circuit in some cases noted that an issue was briefed but would not be
decided. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Because we have upheld the district court’s determination that the asserted claims of
the ’360 patent are invalid, it is unnecessary to address Faulding’s cross-appeal from the
district court’s finding of infringement.”). These undecided issues were excluded from the
database.
141. In the CAFC database, the following query was executed: “court and date(geq
(1/1/1991) and leq (12/31/1991)) and not name(trademark or department or secretary or
“international trade” or “merit systems” or veteran or “federal claims” or “in re”) and
not(“patent appeals and interferences” or “united states claims court”).” Because summary
affirmances did not discuss any issues, they were not responsive to the Lexis search.

1157_1216_SCHWARTZ_112111 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

DEMISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

11/21/2011 4:59 PM

1185

discussed by the Federal Circuit in every case. Opinions from merits
decisions of district courts were included, regardless of whether the district
court resolved the case via preliminary injunction, summary judgment, bench
trial, or jury trial.142 The appellate issue database includes 297 total opinions,
including 54 opinions from 1991; 55 from 1994; 90 from 1997; and 98 from
2000.
3. The Word Count Appellate Database
The word count appellate database includes specific word count
information about certain appellate decisions from 1987 until 2004.143 The
database notes the number of words in each opinion devoted to claim
construction and the number of words devoted to the doctrine of
equivalents. Words devoted to the doctrine of equivalents includes discussion
about any test or argument relating to the doctrine of equivalents including
prosecution history estoppel limitation. The database also records the total
word count discussing all issues on appeal, typically organized in the opinion
under the heading “Discussion.” Most opinions in the database have separate
headings under which the patent and claims were introduced. Consequently,
the claim construction word count typically does not include a recitation of
the claim as a whole.
To attempt to keep as much as possible constant across the 1987 until
2004 time period, only appeals reviewing a grant of summary judgment are
included. No appeals from jury or bench trials are included. 144 Thus, the
word count appellate database excludes decisions in which the jury construed
the claims or the jury decided the doctrine of equivalents. If all opinions were
included, including those reviewing jury verdicts, we may expect a change in
word count due to the doctrinal reallocation of claim construction alone.
This is because there would be a larger appellate record after the judge
construed the claims. In other words, after Markman, the record in a jury case
would include a judicial claim construction. In contrast, the record from jury
trials before Markman frequently did not, as the judge did not expressly
142. Only appeals from utility patent litigation at the district court were included. Nonmerit appeals, such as from motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, were
omitted. Cases in which liability and attorney fees generated separate appeals were only
included in the dataset for the liability appeal.
143. The beginning year of 1987 was selected because jury demands in patent cases were
less frequent before the late 1980s. See Moore, supra note 44, at 851 fig.1.
144. In some cases, summary judgment is granted in part, such as for literal
infringement, and denied in part. In these cases, a trial is conducted on the doctrine of
equivalents. This sort of case was excluded. Only cases in which claim construction and the
doctrine of equivalents was resolved on summary judgment were included.
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construe the claims. Because there is more to review, we may expect more
words in the appellate opinions. There is not a similar problem in summary
judgment appeals. In summary judgment cases before and after Markman, the
judge construed the claims. By using summary judgment cases only, this
concern is substantially alleviated. However, the study assumes that the
district courts would grant summary judgment in the same cases before and
after Markman.
The database is limited to precedential opinions because non-precedential
opinions typically are not as well organized. They often lack the organization
present in precedential opinions, such as a separate “Discussion” section.
This presents potential coding difficulties. Furthermore, the non-precedential
opinions often are very cursory, especially relative to precedential opinions.
Because the opinions are short, the use or omission of introductory
sentences to either the claim construction or doctrine of equivalents
discussion could materially alter the results. For this reason, a word count of
non-precedential opinions was not deemed to be as useful.
To develop the word count appellate database, an overbroad query was
performed on Lexis to locate potentially relevant cases. 145 Thereafter, a
human coder read every case146 to confirm that all of the following were true:
(1) the appeal was from a decision of a federal district court; (2) the federal
district court resolved the lawsuit on summary judgment; and (3) the appeal
addressed either claim construction or the doctrine of equivalents, or both.
The coder noted the number of words devoted to each issue, the number of
words in the “Discussion” section which typically included a discussion of all
issues on appeal, as well as the number of words in the entire opinion. The
“Discussion” section did not include background information about the
patent, technology, or procedural posture of the case. The recitation of the
claim itself was not counted as part of the claim construction analysis. Words
in an alternative opinion, such as concurring or dissenting opinions, were not
counted. The word count appellate database includes word count
information from 183 opinions.

145. In the CAFC database, the following query was executed: “claim w/10 (constru! or
interp!) and (doctrine w/5 equivalents) and “summary judgment” and date(geq (1/1/1987)
and leq (12/31/2004)).”
146. Several significant en banc decisions were omitted to avoid skewing the sample.
These included Markman, Warner-Jenkinson, Cybor, Festo, and Johnson & Johnston. The appeal in
each of these cases only involved one of the doctrines, and the word count of the discussion
in each was substantial.
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LIMITATIONS OF THE DATABASES AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF
APPELLATE DECISIONS

All projects involving empirical studies of legal decisions have limitations
and the present study is no exception. First, patent litigation is extremely
complex. Typically, there are numerous issues raised by the parties. These
issues are often fact-specific for each case. For example, patent litigation
between branded and generic drug manufacturers differs from patent
litigation over a business method patent held by a non-practicing entity. Not
only is the underlying technology different in these scenarios, but the parties’
strategic goals vary as well. Consequently, it is difficult to make
generalizations about patent litigation from the study of individual cases.
Second, the present Article uses data gathered through content analysis
of judicial opinions, which has well-known limitations. 147 These include
unobserved reasoning, strategic behavior, and selection bias.148 Judge Harry
Edwards argues that empirical methods are not useful to understanding
judicial decision-making.149 He argues that statistics cannot distinguish among
extralegal factors that affect judicial decision-making. 150 These unobserved
factors include the state of the case record on appeal and the judicial
deliberations that preceded the opinion.151 He also argues that most empirical
legal studies of case law lack firm support because they exclude summary
affirmances. In the present study, the claim construction appellate decision
database includes summary affirmances; however, the word count appellate
database and appellate issue database do not. By definition, there are no
words to count in a summary affirmance. For the appellate issue database
and the related analysis, the study assumes that the issues raised in summary
affirmances and opinions are the same, an assumption which may not be
correct.

147. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 105–06 (2008) (discussing the limitations of content analysis as part of
their call for greater use of content analysis).
148. For a discussion of these limitations, see R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1128–29 (2004).
149. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt
To Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009).
150. Id. at 1899 (“Legal scholars remain interested in trying to use empirical methods—
most notably the statistical analysis of case outcomes—to understand the effect of extralegal
factors on appellate decisionmaking. In our view, the principal problem with such empirical
legal analyses is that they cannot distinguish between legal and extralegal factors without
considering and accurately accounting for the most important determinants of appellate
decisionmaking: (1) the case records on appeal, (2) the applicable law, (3) controlling
precedent, and (4) judicial deliberations.”).
151. Id.
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Separately, patent law changed in many ways in the last twenty years. The
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit issued numerous substantive decisions
that altered the law, only some of which are described by this Article.
Changes to one doctrine may cause substantive effects on the law in other
doctrines. Furthermore, Congress also amended the Patent Act several times
during the time period of this study. These changes include adjusting how to
calculate the patent term 152 and requiring publication of most patent
applications before issuance.153
Each of these changes may affect patent litigant strategies and
substantive patent law doctrines. Because patent litigation as a whole is so
complex, it is incredibly complicated to develop and test empirical models.
This complexity is especially prevalent when multiple doctrines in patent law
are interrelated and studied simultaneously. Changes in precedent can alter
lawyers’ behavior in drafting patents. Furthermore, changes in precedent can
also influence party behavior in litigation. Thus, the patent litigation system is
dynamic and, over time, the types of lawsuits brought will change.
Another limitation is that the changes studied involving claim
construction and the doctrine of equivalents are endogenous to the Federal
Circuit. In other words, while this Article termed Markman and Cybor as the
cause of doctrinal reallocation and displacement, the court itself made these
changes. As the Federal Circuit made the Markman I and Cybor decisions, as
well as the subsequent opinions studied in this Article, the events are not
truly independent. No empirical methodology can correct for this.
Furthermore, this Article does not differentiate among the various judges on
the Federal Circuit; rather, the Federal Circuit is treated as a single static
court. While the data are largely consistent with the propounded hypotheses,
this Article makes no claims regarding causation. To the extent it makes any
assertions, it is limited to mere correlation. The explanations for the
correlations deserve further empirical and theoretical scrutiny.
Another limitation stems from general changes in litigation over the
studied time period. Even outside of patent lawsuits, litigation in general has
increased since the early 1990s. For example, there were approximately
265,000 lawsuits filed in federal court in fiscal year 1992.154 In contrast, in
fiscal year 2008, there were approximately 350,000 lawsuits, an increase of
152. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 532(a), § 154, 108 Stat.
4809, 4983–85 (1994).
153. Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 1536
(1999) (enacting into law the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, S. 1948, 106th
Cong., tit. IV, sec. 4502, § 122 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006))).
154. U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile, UNITED STATES COURTS (Apr. 1998),
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cms.pl (accessed by choosing “ALL DISTRICT
COURTS” from the dropdown menu and pressing the “Generate” button).
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about twenty-five percent.155 Total federal case appeals also slightly increased
in a generally linear fashion between the early 1990s and 2008.156 The rate of
summary judgment in all litigation also may have changed over time.157
In addition to the changing nature of patent and civil litigation over time,
any study of appellate decisions has certain inherent limitations. These
limitations include most notably a potential selection bias. 158 Because
previous articles described in detail the potential selection effect, it will be
only briefly discussed here. 159 First, appellate decisions are not a random
sample of all patent disputes or all patent infringement complaints.
Obviously, in real-world patent litigation, in each case the merits, the parties,
and the parties’ resources differ. 160 Each of these factors affects which
disputes become lawsuits, which lawsuits proceed through final, appealable
judgment, and which decisions are appealed. The closer cases, such as those
fifty-fifty cases wherein either party could prevail (including cases with closer
claim construction arguments), may be appealed at a higher frequency. 161
However, the present study does not rely upon case outcomes, which
evaluate the performance of the district court and are susceptible to
distortion based on selection effects.162 Instead, because this Article examines
155. U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile, UNITED STATES COURTS (2008),
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2008.pl (accessed by choosing “ALL DISTRICT
COURTS” from the dropdown menu and pressing the “Generate” button).
156. Federal Court Management Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS (2010), http://www.
uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html.
157. Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 141
(2000) (noting the declining percentage of civil cases proceeding to trial in federal courts
over time, and tying that to “the emergence of summary judgment as the new fulcrum of
federal civil dispute resolution”).
158. See Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note 136, at 1101–06.
159. E.g., Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1003–24
(2010); Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note 136, at 1101–06; Ted Sichelman, The
Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1179–83 (2010).
160. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 202–05, 250–51 (1998).
161. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9–10 (2001); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1, 4, 16 (1984). Other empirical studies have
reported plaintiff win rates in patent jury trials at nearly seventy percent, contrary to what
one would expect using the limiting case of the Priest/Klein economic theory. Kimberly A.
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV.
365, 385–86 (2000); see also Alan C. Marco, The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent
Litigation: Evidence from Trials, 4 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, iss. 1, art. 21 (2004),
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol4/iss1/art21/ (reporting that there does not
appear to be a selection bias tending to produce a fifty percent patent infringement win rate,
but that there does appear to be a selection bias toward fifty percent in the validity win rate).
162. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 148, at 1127–29.
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appellate choices such as whether to publish an opinion or designate it as
precedential, and other metrics of solely appellate court decision-making, the
potential selection effects problem is slightly muted.
Studying the time period surrounding a major change such as Markman
also presents difficulties. For example, the cases that survived until an
appellate decision may have changed across this period. When juries
performed claim construction, more accused infringers may have settled
instead of risking a jury ruling.163 After Markman, accused infringers in similar
cases could more freely litigate claim construction before a judge. As more
courts utilized a completely separate claim construction hearing, the number
of litigants willing to proceed through claim construction may have
increased. For these reasons, the types of cases that resulted in a Federal
Circuit decision may be different before and after Markman.
The word count appellate database has a separate concern because it has
a smaller sized dataset. It currently analyzes word count information from
less than two hundred Federal Circuit opinions over a fifteen-year period. On
average, there were about ten opinions per year, 164 with more opinions in
recent years and fewer in earlier years. The small number of observations
affects the statistical tests performed. Furthermore, word counts in appellate
decisions only illustrate behavior at the Federal Circuit level. The database
does not directly report doctrines or word counts raised in the trial court.
Moreover, because it is limited to cases in which the court granted summary
judgment, it consists almost entirely of cases wherein the accused infringer
prevailed at the district court. For each of the foregoing reasons, all results
and discussion of the data are subject to the limitations discussed in this
Section.
IV.

DATA ON THE DEMISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS

Using the theories provided in Part II, this Part provides hypotheses on
the ramifications of these phenomena including hypotheses about the
doctrine of equivalents. Part IV also sets forth the results of empirical testing
of the hypotheses. Section IV.A provides the doctrinal reallocation
hypotheses and results. Section IV.B examines the doctrinal displacement
hypotheses and results.

163. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, supra note 136, at 1099.
164. There are more than ten claim construction opinions per year. However, the word
count appellate database was created using only cases in which both claim construction and
the doctrine of equivalents were discussed.
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REALLOCATION HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS

This Section examines hypotheses and data that suggest that the
horizontal and vertical reallocations in Markman and Cybor made claim
construction more central and important in patent litigation. According to
the theory proposed in Part II, supra, the horizontal and vertical reallocations
illustrated in Figure 3 provided more control of claim construction to the
appellate court. The control gave the Federal Circuit the ability to emphasize
or deemphasize claim construction in the overall context of patent litigation.
When confronted with the opportunity, the Federal Circuit elected to make
claim construction more rather than less important. At first glance, this
statement seems obvious—claim construction is perhaps the central doctrine
in patent litigation today. Practitioners and professors who came of age after
Markman may believe that claim construction was always central to patent
litigation. However, before Markman, it is debatable whether claim
construction was as important. 165 This hypothesis tests the conventional
wisdom that claim construction was always important.166
The hypotheses derive from the time period around Markman and Cybor.
The Federal Circuit exerted control over lower courts 167 and over claim
construction as a result of Markman.168 This Article argues that the Federal
Circuit enhanced the importance of claim construction to increase the
predictability of patent litigation. This explanation is consistent with the
remarks of Judge Plager,169 and with the statements in the Markman opinion
itself.170 Generally, a court using its control to increase the importance of a

165. See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 360 (“It was not until the 1995 en banc Federal Circuit decision in
Markman . . . that [the notice function of patents] reached the forefront of patent law
jurisprudence.”).
166. See, e.g., Edward M. O’Toole, How To Prepare for and Conduct Markman Hearings 2006,
in HOW TO PREPARE & CONDUCT MARKMAN HEARINGS 2006, at 175, 207 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 873, 2006) (“After
all, claim construction has always been an important aspect of resolution of patent disputes,
and most patent cases continue, as they always have, to turn on claim construction—
impacting the issue of infringement or validity, or both.”).
167. Legal doctrine is taught by higher courts to lower courts. See Tonja Jacobi &
Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326 (2007).
168. John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 123 (2000) (“Together Markman and Cybor
have . . . centralized judicial power to interpret claims in the Federal Circuit.”).
169. See Plager, supra note 50.
170. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (Mayer, J., concurring) (noting that the majority opinion attempts “to free patent
litigation from the ‘unpredictability’ of jury verdicts”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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doctrine will perform certain observable tasks. Empirically testing whether
these tasks occurred in patent law permits evaluation of the theory.
The Article sets forth infra three hypotheses relating to doctrinal
reallocation. The first hypothesis is that, after Markman, the Federal Circuit
issued a greater percentage of written claim construction opinions. The
second is that, after Markman, the Federal Circuit issued a greater percentage
of precedential claim construction opinions. The third is that, after Markman,
a greater percentage of claim construction appeals arose from summary
judgment. Each of these hypotheses, both separately and together, is
consistent with the view that the Federal Circuit made claim construction
more important after Markman.
1. Reallocation Hypothesis #1: After Markman I, the Federal Circuit issued
a greater percentage of written opinions
The first hypothesis contends that the Federal Circuit issued a greater
percentage of written opinions on claim construction after Markman. More
written opinions signal that the Federal Circuit believes that claim
construction is important. Obviously, the appellate court can only issue
opinions on a particular doctrine that the parties raise on appeal. This caps
the maximum number of opinions an appellate court can generate.
However, the federal courts of appeal need not produce a written
opinion in every case. They have the option of affirming without providing a
written opinion, a procedure known as summary affirmance.171 When using a
summary affirmance, the appellate court disposes of the case without
explaining its reasoning. 172 Alternatively, the court may issue a written
opinion that sets forth the complete basis for its opinion. 173 The court
chooses which cases to decide by written opinions and which to decide by
summary affirmance. 174 Issuing more written opinions cues litigants of the
increased importance of the doctrine. A greater percentage of claim
construction appeals were (and will continue to be) resolved by written
opinions after Markman.
171. See FED. CIR. R. 36.
172. Pamela S. Karlan, Comment, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of
Caperton, 123 HARV. L. REV. 80, 83 (2009); see, e.g., Sutton v. Nokia Corp., No. 2010-1218,
2010 WL 5230901 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming decision of lower tribunal without providing
any explanation).
173. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, & JUDGING 165 (1st ed.
1994).
174. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (“We, of course, agree that the
courts of appeals should have wide latitude in their decisions of whether or how to write
opinions. That is especially true with respect to summary affirmances.”).

1157_1216_SCHWARTZ_112111 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/21/2011 4:59 PM

DEMISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

1193

Moving now to the empirical results, Figure 4, infra, shows the annual
percentage of claim construction appeals that garnered a written opinion.
Figure 4: Percentage of Claim Construction Appeals with a Written Opinion
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The ordinate illustrates the percentage of decisions that received a written
opinion plotted against the year of the Federal Circuit disposition. All of the
opinions in a given year are collapsed into a single data point.175 For clarity,
Figure 4 notes the dates of the Markman I and Cybor decisions.
Almost simultaneously with Markman I in 1995, the Federal Circuit
decreased the rate of summary affirmances and began issuing more written
opinions on claim construction. To provide a more comprehensive analysis, a
multiple-regression model of the data was developed. According to the
model, even when other potentially explanatory variables are controlled for,
the odds of a written opinion after Markman I are more than twice as high as

175. There have been 1288 opinions over eighteen years, and there are approximately
seventy-two opinions per year. Regression assumes that each variable is independent and
identically distributed, but this assumption may not hold in a precedential system in which a
prior decision influences subsequent decisions. See James Greiner, Judicial Decisions as Data
Points, SOCIAL SCIENCE STATISTICS BLOG (March 20, 2007, 16:40 EST), http://www.
iq.harvard.edu/blog/sss/archives/2007/03/ (arguing that certain empirical assumptions
should be cautiously considered in a precedential system). After a court decides a significant
precedential case which clarifies or alters the substantive doctrine, one might expect a
subsequent decrease in written and precedential opinions. Here, the trend illustrated in
Figures 4 and 5 shows increased precedential and written opinions after Markman, which is
in the opposite direction of this prediction. In fact, the role of precedent may if anything be
downwardly tampering the effects. However, the effects of precedent are very complicated,
and an alternative hypothesis is that new case law invites uncertainty and more precedential
written opinions. Further research is needed into the general question of the relationship
between legal precedent and the assumptions in empirical models.
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before Markman I, and the difference is statistically significant. 176 As
illustrated in Figure 4, the Federal Circuit resolved only about sixty percent of
all claim construction appeals from 1991 until 1995 with a written opinion.
Thus, it was quite likely that a claim construction appeal resulted in no case
law (either precedential or non-precedential), and no guidance to litigants.177
After 1995 (the year Markman I was decided), however, the rate of written
opinions quickly increased to between eighty and eighty-five percent.178
It should be noted that there is a downward spike in Figure 4 that begins
in September 2006 and ends in very early 2007. The reason for that spike
presently cannot be completely explained. The time period of the spike
begins in September, which is roughly contemporaneous with the turnover
of law clerks. Perhaps for that year only, some judges amassed a backlog of
cases with their old clerks and used summary affirmances to pare their
dockets. An alternative explanation relates to district court decisions appealed
shortly before the en banc Phillips v. AWH decision but decided by the
Federal Circuit around the time of the spike.179 Perhaps these were appeals in
which the district court correctly construed the claims but used the wrong
rationale, such as placing a heavy reliance on dictionaries. The Federal Circuit
judges may have agreed that the result was correct and utilized summary
176. The detailed regression results can be found in Tables 4a and 4b in the Appendix.
The control variables for the main regression of Tables 4a are the geographic location of the
district court (i.e., which Circuit the district court resided in); whether the district court was
in one of the ten busiest patent districts during the given year; the technology of the
underlying patent (chemical, mechanical, or electrical), the posture of the district court
judgment (preliminary injunction, summary judgment, jury trial, or bench trial), and winner
at the district court (patentee or accused infringer). The odds ratio is 2.86 with a p-value of
0.000. A p-value of 0.05 or less signifies that the null hypothesis—in this case that there is no
difference in the use of summary affirmance/Rule 36 before and after Markman—can be
rejected with a 95% confidence level. Here, the p-value is 0.000, which means that the nullhypothesis can be rejected. The odds ratio means it was 186% more likely at the mean for a
summary affirmance/Rule 36 claim construction decision before Markman I, after
controlling for the aforementioned variables. A separate regression shown in Table 4b
includes the total number of patent opinions and Rule 36 cases on any issue, not just claim
construction. The results of the separate regression show that even controlling for Federal
Circuit patent opinions and Rule 36 decisions outside of claim construction, it was 96%
more likely at the mean for a Rule 36 claim construction decision before Markman I than
after (p-value=0.000). For a discussion of regression analysis, see supra note 175.
177. The author takes no position on the optimal or minimum amount of case law to
develop a doctrine. Rather, it is only noted that after Markman I, the court employed Rule 36
less frequently than before.
178. It is also worth noting that there were no substantial increases in the number of
active Federal Circuit judges during this time period.
179. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (resolving an
intra-circuit split on whether dictionary definitions should be the default claim construction
of a disputed term).
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affirmances in these instances. Finally, it is possible that it is an unintentional
clustering of results in the data.180 In any event, this data was included within
the regression and the results remain statistically significant.
After Markman, the Federal Circuit vastly increased the number of
written opinions describing claim construction methodology and analysis.181
Not only did it receive more appeals involving claim construction after
Markman,182 but it drafted written opinions for a greater percentage of those
appeals. 183 The larger volume of opinions signals to litigants the increased
importance of the doctrine. When more cases address a particular issue,
litigants understand that the court is interested in the issue. Because summary
affirmances do not include any written opinions, the public (other than the
particular litigants involved in the case) cannot easily know what issues were
raised in those cases. The focus on claim construction in opinions
encouraged litigants to raise this issue on appeal. This further increased the
significance of the doctrine of claim construction.
2. Reallocation Hypothesis #2: After Markman I, the Federal Circuit issued
a greater percentage of precedential opinions
The second hypothesis is that the Federal Circuit issued a greater
percentage of precedential opinions on claim construction after Markman. In
addition to resolving cases without any opinion (by summary affirmance), the
courts can also issue different types of written opinions. For every written
opinion, the courts of appeals may designate the opinion as either
precedential or non-precedential. 184 Precedential opinions have various
functions—announcing new law, applying settled law to new facts, and

180. A Federal Circuit judge on the bench during this time period told the author that
he believes it is random.
181. Some may argue that a court issues a written opinion instead of a summary
affirmance when the dispute is complicated. However, there is no reason to believe that the
complexity of disputes changed in 1995. So this does not explain the change in the frequency
of written opinions in claim construction beginning in 1995.
182. There are several potential reasons that parties brought more appeals involving
claim construction issues. One reason, which is consistent with doctrinal reallocation, is that
the parties recognized the court’s elevation of the doctrine in importance. If parties know
the court believes an issue is important, it is not surprising that it is frequently raised.
183. It is possible that the increase in Rule 36 is mere happenstance, or alternatively, due
to an increase in the quality of the briefs submitted by the parties. However, because the
timing of the increase so closely corresponds to Markman, these other explanations appear
unlikely.
184. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 234–35 (2005).
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recording important discussion or criticisms of settled rules. 185 The court
spends more time drafting a precedential opinion because it binds future
appellate panels as precedent. 186 Non-precedential opinions, also known as
unpublished opinions, are citable by litigants but do not serve as precedent in
the district or appellate court.187 The main rationale for unpublished opinions
is that they conserve judicial resources.188 They are typically shorter with less
discussion of the facts. All federal courts of appeal utilize non-precedential
opinions to some extent. 189 Courts can choose which opinions to make
precedential or non-precedential.
Increasing the proportion of precedential opinions may increase the
importance of the doctrine. Precedential opinions signal that the appellate
court considers the doctrine significant. To increase the importance of claim
construction, the Federal Circuit increased the percentage of precedential
written opinions after Markman.
There are other possible reasons a court may increase the number of
written opinions or the designation of precedential opinions. For example, it
could be that a new, fledgling doctrine needs to be fleshed out more in case
law. It is doubtful that this rationale applies to claim construction, even
though a new actor—the judge—was given responsibility for the task. The
Federal Circuit articulated the canons of claim construction in numerous

185. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807, 808; see also William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 623, 632–33 (1988);
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-precedential Precedent—Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1182–83
(1978).
186. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU
L. REV. 3, 50.
187. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 was amended in 2007 to require all circuit courts to permit
citation of unpublished opinions. Before 2007, some circuits permitted citation of
unpublished opinions without limitation and some discouraged their citation. For a good list
of the differences among circuits pre-2007, see Robert T. Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal
Appellate Decisions Issued Before 2007, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Mar. 9, 2007),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Unpub_Opinions.pdf.
188. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the
Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1290, 1293 (1996) (stating that increased judicial caseload
required limited publication of cases).
189. Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of Article III Duty; or
Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules Are (Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 960 (2009) (“[T]he percentage of federal appellate decisions that are
unpublished presently runs at almost eighty-five percent . . . .”).
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cases before Markman.190 Furthermore, if the doctrine merely needed to be
fleshed out, the increase in precedential opinions should be temporary,
ending when the doctrine was sufficiently developed. Consequently, more
precedential opinions over a long period of time may signal the increased
salience of the doctrine.
Turning now to the empirical data, Figure 5, infra, shows the percentage
of claim construction appeals resolved by a precedential opinion from 1991
until 2008.
Figure 5: Percentage of Claim Construction Appeals
Resolved with a Precedential Opinion
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After controlling for potentially explanatory variables in a multiple
regression model, the results are statistically significant; it was more than
twice as likely for the Federal Circuit to issue a precedential opinion after
Markman I than before. 191 Beginning in 1996, there was a spike in the
percentage of claim construction appeals that were resolved via precedential
190. See generally 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[2][a] (rev. 2007)
(identifying twelve examples of canons of claim construction and providing citations of case
authority for the canons dating back until the 1930s).
191. The regression details can be found in Table 5a in the Appendix. The control
variables are the geographic location of the district court (i.e., which Circuit the district court
resided in); whether the district court was in one of the ten busiest patent districts during the
given year; the technology of the underlying patent (chemical, mechanical, or electrical), the
procedural posture of the district court judgment (preliminary injunction, summary
judgment, jury trial, or bench trial), and winner at the district court (patentee or accused
infringer). The odds ratio is 2.35 with a p-value of 0.000, meaning that it is 135% more likely
at the mean. The second regression controlling for overall Federal Circuit patent docket
could not be performed. It was not feasible to gather data on precedential opinions on all
areas of law.
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opinions. Non-precedential opinions and summary affirmances are two
different methods of deciding cases without a precedential opinion.
In doctrines such as claim construction that are based upon guidelines
rather than rules, precedent is especially important in teaching how to
properly decide cases.192 Precedent binds future court panels. In theory, as
the volume of precedents increases, courts should be more likely to find a
prior opinion that matches or nearly matches the facts at hand.193 After the
1996 spike, the level of precedential opinions remained elevated compared to
the pre-Markman levels. More specifically, in the years before Markman
(1991–1994), the Federal Circuit decided 30.5% of claim construction
appeals with precedential opinions. But, in the years afterwards (1997–2003),
the Federal Circuit decided 46.5% with precedential opinions. Some may
argue that increased precedential opinions were necessary to develop the
claim construction doctrine after Markman clarified that it was a matter of
law. However, the Federal Circuit articulated the various canons of claim
construction in numerous cases before 1995.194 Furthermore, this would not
explain why there is still, fifteen years after Markman I, an elevated level of
precedential opinions. Today, the Federal Circuit has explained each of the
canons in numerous post-Markman opinions.
Thus, the Federal Circuit increased the number of written and
precedential claim construction opinions after Markman. Since the Federal
Circuit arguably desired litigants and district court judges to focus on claim
construction, it appears to be a reasonable and prudent decision to increase
the body of case law analyzing that issue. Now, almost fifteen years after
Markman, there are a plethora of precedential claim construction opinions.
3. Reallocation Hypothesis #3: After Cybor, a greater proportion of appeals
were from grants of summary judgment
The third hypothesis asserts that a greater proportion of appeals that
reach the Federal Circuit were from grants of motions for summary

192. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577–
78 (1992) (discussing the role of precedent when standards are utilized).
193. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2622–23 (1995) (arguing that the rules and precedents resulting from litigation have
“obvious importance for guiding future behavior and imposing order and certainty”).
194. See generally 5A CHISUM, supra note 190, § 18.03[2][a] (identifying twelve examples of
canons of claim construction and providing citations of case authority for the canons dating
back until the 1930s). To be fair, there were some short-lived intra-circuit disputes about
how to perform claim construction. Holbrook, supra note 27, at 146–48 (noting the court’s
struggle between the Vitronics and Texas Digital methodologies). However, the level of
precedential opinions has been relatively constant, not tied to particular disagreements.
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judgment. As the claim construction doctrine became more important, it was
dispositive in more cases. District court judges could more easily grant
summary judgment because of the horizontal reallocation. In patent cases,
there is often less dispute over the structure of the accused product than
there is concerning the construction of the patent. Because claim
construction is a matter of law, it is resolved without using the summary
judgment standard, namely, all inferences to the non-moving party. Once the
primary battle on claim construction is resolved, the remaining issues on
literal infringement are more straightforward.195 The vertical reallocation also
encouraged resolution by summary judgment. Because the district court
judges understood that their decisions would be reviewed on appeal using a
de novo standard, they desired to resolve the cases quicker. Finally, as the
doctrine became more important and more central to patent law, district
courts could entirely dispose of more cases after construing the claims.
The data reflects that the percentage of claim construction appeals
decided by summary judgment increased over time. Figure 6, infra, shows the
percentage of claim construction appeals that arose from district court
summary judgment orders.
Figure 6: Percentage of Claim Construction Appeals from Summary Judgment
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As claim construction became more important, a greater percentage of
appeals reviewed summary judgment decisions as opposed to the results of
bench trials, jury trials, or rulings on preliminary injunctions. This data is

195. Literal infringement and claim construction may be seen as doctrinally linked after
Markman I.

1157_1216_SCHWARTZ_112111 (DO NOT DELETE)

1200

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

11/21/2011 4:59 PM

[Vol. 26:1157

consistent with data from other researchers arguing that Markman
encouraged summary judgment in patent cases.196
The multiple regression model indicates that it was over one hundred
percent more likely for the appeal to be from a grant of summary judgment
after Cybor than before. 197 As can be seen from Figure 6, less than forty
percent of claim construction appeals were from summary judgment during
the period from 1991 until 1993. The first increase in appeals from summary
judgment occurred before Markman I in 1994. Looking at this data alone, it
does not appear that Markman I by itself immediately caused the increase in
summary judgments. Instead, a temporary increase appears just before
Markman I, and a sustained increase appears around 1998, the time of the
Cybor decision.
However, there is a natural time lag in the litigation process. The appeal
process itself takes approximately one year, and the trial court proceedings
longer than that.198 Considering this delay, the possibility that the increase in
appeals from summary judgment is due to Markman cannot be excluded.
After 1998, the percentage of claim construction appeals from summary
judgment sharply increased to almost seventy percent. It thereafter remained
substantially constant. In the last ten years, approximately seventy percent of
appeals of claim constructions arose in the summary judgment context.
Others reported similar increases in summary judgment in patent litigation,
even beyond claim construction. For example, Petherbridge, in his findings,
noted a trend toward an increased percentage of appeals from a finding of
summary judgment of non-infringement.199 Data on whether district courts
issued fewer summary judgments in earlier years are not readily available.

196. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 958 (noting that Markman drives summary
judgments); Burk & Lemley, supra note 26, at 1795 (asserting that Markman increased
summary judgment); Lee & Krug, supra note 131, at 59 (observing that the Markman
decisions could encourage summary proceedings); Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect,
supra note 2, at 243.
197. The results of the regression can be found in Table 6a in the Appendix. The
control variables are the same as those for precedential opinions described supra note 191.
The odds ratio for this regression is 3.38 with a p-value of 0.000.
198. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 282–
83 (2005) (noting that the average trial court patent case, including and weighted down by
those which settled early, pended well over a year).
199. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1394; see also Mary A.
Woodford, Presentation to Ropes & Gray LLP: Preliminary Analysis of IPLC Data: Patent
Infringement Cases 13 (June 2009) (on file with author) (reporting fifty-six percent of patent
cases filed between 2000 and 2008 and which reached judgment were decided by summary
judgment).
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The rise in summary judgment since Markman is not surprising. First, as
Allison and Lemley argued, once the district court judges spent time
evaluating patent claims, it was only natural for them to attempt to resolve
the case. In fact, many judges only construed the claims in the context of
dispositive motions. Further, summary judgment may be appropriate in a
large number of these cases. Once the judges construed the claims, there will
not be a genuine issue of material fact in cases where the parties do not
dispute the structure or function of the accused device or method. Second, as
discussed in Section II.B.2, the doctrinal displacement of the doctrine of
equivalents followed the reallocation in claim construction. The doctrine of
equivalents was historically a quintessential jury issue. By reducing the
importance of this doctrine, judges could grant more summary judgment
motions. Third, the increased importance of claim construction and the
reduced importance of the doctrine of equivalents may motivate both courts
and litigants to resolve cases via summary judgment. The Federal Circuit’s
high claim construction reversal rate is well known. 200 The Federal Circuit
also does not review claim constructions through an interlocutory appeal.201
Summary judgment permits quick review by the Federal Circuit, a goal often
shared by both litigants and the district court.202
The doctrinal reallocation in patent law had other effects. Overall, the
reallocation focused resources—of the Federal Circuit, of district courts, and
of litigants—more on a single issue in the case. Many believe that claim
construction ought to be central to patent litigation. By focusing resources
on this one issue, the end product is better-organized Federal Circuit
opinions. Before and immediately after Markman, the Federal Circuit issued
often-confusing claim construction opinions. 203 The Federal Circuit would
blend claim construction and infringement discussions. Now the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction opinions are better written and more
200. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Michel, C.J., dissenting) (noting the problem in claim construction of “a steadily high
reversal rate”).
201. See, e.g., V. Ajay Singh, Interlocutory Appeals in Patent Cases Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 1292(c)(2): Are They Still Justified and Are They Implemented Correctly?, 55 DUKE L.J. 179, 196
(2005) (“The Federal Circuit has thus far refused to hear permissive appeals related to claim
construction.”).
202. Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of
the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 681 (2004).
203. An old, illustrative case is Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948
(Fed. Cir. 1992). In Morton, the opinion has an unlabeled background section. It follows with
a discussion containing a section labeled I, but no other subsections. Section I blends claim
construction and literal infringement and also addresses attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285.
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organized.204 The clearer organization after Markman aids the reader, whether
it is district court judges or potential litigants, in following the courts’
reasoning.
B.

DOCTRINAL DISPLACEMENT HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS

This Section examines hypotheses and data that suggest that the doctrine
of equivalents has been displaced by claim construction. Turning back to the
theory, doctrinal displacement suggests that claim construction should have
displaced another doctrine. The Federal Circuit horizontally reallocated the
doctrine of claim construction to the judge, vertically reallocated the standard
of review to de novo, and raised the profile and importance of the claim
construction doctrine. Raising the importance of claim construction meant
that more litigants would elect to focus on it. This caused a displacement of
other doctrines in patent law. The first hypothesis is that as claim
construction became more important, the doctrine of equivalents became
less important.
1. Displacement Hypothesis #1: After Markman I, the frequency with which
the Federal Circuit analyzed the doctrine of equivalents decreased and claim
construction increased
According to displacement theory, 205 three influences—litigation
constraints, judicial constraints, and the gatekeeping nature of claim
construction—together caused a displacement of the doctrine of equivalents.
Courts used claim construction to resolve all claim scope issues. District
court judges began to rely more on summary judgment of non-infringement.
Litigants subsequently must have learned that the doctrine of equivalents was
unlikely to prevail; consequently, arguments relating to the doctrine of
equivalents were dropped or downplayed in many briefs. Because claim
construction consumed more words, less space was left for other issues.206
This hypothesis will be evaluated by analyzing the issues addressed in Federal
Circuit written opinions in patent infringement appeals over selected years.
204. An exemplary recent case is Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2008). There, the opinion consists of three parts: (1) a background description of
the technology and proceedings in the district court; (2) a detailed discussion of the claim
construction dispute and resolution; and (3) a brief conclusion that a grant of summary
judgment must be vacated because of an erroneous claim construction. Id.
205. See supra Section II.B.
206. While traditionally a jury issue, the doctrine of equivalents can be resolved on
summary judgment if one of the legal limitations to the doctrine of equivalents applies, or if
there is no disputed issue of material fact. Consequently, when evaluating appeals of
judgments for non-infringement, the Federal Circuit must consider the doctrine of
equivalents, if raised by the patentee.
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After Markman, the frequency with which the Federal Circuit discussed the
doctrine of equivalents should have dropped because litigants did not press it
on appeal.
Previous scholars have noted the decline of the doctrine of equivalents;
yet, there is debate on the cause and timing of its demise. As noted supra,
Allison and Lemley argue that Markman itself ended the doctrine of
equivalents. 207 They assert that after a judge construes the claims and
concludes that the accused product is not within the literal scope of the
claims, the judge likely desires to resolve the case on summary judgment. To
completely resolve the case requires that the judge also conclude that the
product is not equivalent. Petherbridge argues that Festo appeared to be a
tipping point for the doctrine of equivalents, showing that after Festo, a
patentee’s success rate on appeal on the doctrine of equivalents significantly
dropped. Thus, Allison and Lemley disagree with Petherbridge as to the
triggering event of the decline of the doctrine of equivalents.
The present Article cannot conclusively resolve the debate. Both scholars
may be partially correct. However, along with a new theoretical framework to
understand the decline of the doctrine of equivalents, it presents some
additional evidence on this question. The new data supports the view that at
least part of the decline occurred immediately after the increased importance
of claim construction. The doctrine of equivalents may have continued its
decline after Festo. As discussed in Section IV.A, supra, the doctrinal
reallocation of claim construction resulted in claim construction becoming
more important in patent litigation. Shifting the importance of a single
doctrine has larger implications in real-world litigation, and the claim
construction shift preceded a decline in the significance of the doctrine of
equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents appears to have been in a more prominent
position before Markman. When reading the opinions issued from 1991 until
1995, the author found that the Federal Circuit addressed the doctrine of
equivalents more frequently during that time period than the present time. In
particular, the Federal Circuit often discussed the doctrine of equivalents in
robust detail, much the way the Federal Circuit discusses claim construction
today. Sometimes the Federal Circuit discussed the doctrine of equivalents in
the same breath as claim construction. Additionally, claim construction was
less important in patent litigation pre-Markman. Unlike patent litigation
today, patentees then did not focus on the claim language to prove their
charges of infringement. Instead, they presented arguments to the jury about
207. Supra Part I.
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the “invention” and attempted to divorce the “invention” from the specific
claim language.
Figure 7, infra, displays the prevalence of claim construction and the
doctrine of equivalents before the Federal Circuit in 1991, 1994, 1997, and
2000.208
Figure 7: Percentage of Federal Circuit Written Opinions Analyzing the
Doctrine of Equivalents and Claim Construction
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The most striking aspect of Figure 7 is the increase in claim construction
at the Federal Circuit. Before Markman, claim construction appeared in less
than fifty percent of appellate decisions, as shown in the left two bars. After
Markman, it substantially increased, reaching seventy percent of decisions by
2000.209 During the same time period, the doctrine of equivalents declined,
albeit less dramatically. While the results surrounding the doctrine of
equivalents are not statistically significant, the general trend is not in the
wrong direction. These results reflect a limited sample of cases.
One reason why a larger drop in the doctrine of equivalents is not
evident relates to the increase in appeals from grants of summary judgment
of non-infringement. In order to grant summary judgment of noninfringement, the district court must determine that there is no issue of
208. The percentage is based upon the number of opinions raising the issue/doctrine
relative to the total number of merits opinions for the year.
209. Claim construction is a gatekeeper doctrine that may be present in invalidity and
infringement discussions, while the doctrine of equivalents may be present only in
infringement discussions. However, claim construction always had this status as a
gatekeeper; Markman did not start it. Consequently, the gatekeeper status cannot explain the
difference between the rates before and after Markman.
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material fact to either literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents. To
affirm, the Federal Circuit should mention, at least briefly, both bases of the
district court’s ruling. There was a large jump in appeals from orders granting
summary judgment of non-infringement from 1991 until 2000. Considering
all merits appeals in the appellate issue database, appeals from summary
judgments of non-infringement comprised 13.0% of 1991 opinions, 20.0%
of 1994 opinions, 28.9% of 1997 opinions, and 46.9% of 2000 opinions.
Consequently, changes in summary judgment practice in patent litigation,
perhaps driven by Cybor, may have played a role in inflating the number of
doctrine of equivalents arguments raised in later years. This is consistent with
the judicial constraints explanation for displacement.
The coding mechanism used in the appellate issue database may also
partially explain why the drop in the doctrine of equivalents appears modest.
Each issue raised in the appellate decision was weighted equivalently. For
example, if the Federal Circuit discussed doctrine of equivalents for a
paragraph and claim construction for five pages, the database coded each
doctrine the same.
2. Displacement Hypothesis #2: After Markman I, the Federal Circuit
discussed the doctrine of equivalents in fewer words, and claim construction
with more words
The second displacement hypothesis was tested using the word count
appellate database. Word count data permits analysis of displacement in
greater detail and overcomes the aforementioned limitation of the appellate
issue database. Even when the Federal Circuit analyzed the doctrine of
equivalents by the Federal Circuit after Markman, it should occupy less space
in the opinions. Decreased word count can support the hypothesis, assuming
that word count is a proxy for importance or at least a proxy for how much
analysis the court deemed sufficient for explanation and resolution of an
issue.210

210. Other studies have used word count as a rough proxy for importance. See, e.g.,
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 587 (2008) (analyzing word count data because “in explaining (or defending) their
analysis of a legal issue, judges are generally more likely to dedicate a greater share of their
explanations to considerations that they deem to be more important”); Jennifer L. Groscup
et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal
Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002); Hall & Wright, supra note 147, at 117 (“For
instance, some studies count the number of words or paragraphs devoted to discussing
particular factors as an indication of the factors’ relative importance.”); Carl W. Roberts, A
Conceptual Framework for Qualitative Text Analysis, 34 QUALITY & QUANTITY 259, 263 (2000)
(“Analyses of word-counts yield inferences about the predominance of themes in texts.”);
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Figure 8, infra, shows the word count of summary judgment opinions
involving claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents over time. As
described in more detail in Section III.A.3, supra, the percentages were
calculated by dividing the number of words in the opinion addressing claim
construction or the doctrine of equivalents by the number of words in the
“Discussion” section of the opinion addressing all issues on appeal.211
Figure 8: Percentage of Words Devoted to
Claim Construction and Doctrine of Equivalents

The vertical lines at 1995 and 2000 in Figure 8 represent Markman I and
Festo. It is important to remember that the word count appellate database
only includes resolutions from summary judgment so juries did not evaluate
either issue in the district court in any of the observations.
Figure 8 shows that the doctrine of equivalents occupied about a third of
the discussion of Federal Circuit opinions before Markman I while claim
construction entailed about a quarter of the opinions. During this time
period, the doctrine of equivalents averaged a slightly greater percentage of
the words than claim construction. After Markman I, the percentage of words
devoted to the doctrine of equivalents dropped off, and varied from
Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Development of a Legal Rule: The Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance, 32
L. & SOC’Y REV. 613 (1998).
211. The yearly percentage was calculated by averaging the percentages for each decision
within the year. If the yearly percentage was calculated by averaging the total number of
relevant words in the opinions, then a few long opinions in a given year would skew the
results. In other words, an opinion with a large word count would have a disproportionate
influence on the overall results.
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approximately twelve percent to approximately twenty-five percent. In
contrast, during the same time period, claim construction increased in terms
of the percentage of words in an opinion. From 1996 until 2000, claim
construction comprised between forty and fifty-five percent of the opinions
each year. Before Markman I, it encompassed between twenty and thirty
percent of opinions. These results are statistically significant.212
To keep this result in the proper context, the total word count in the
discussion section of opinions varied slightly over time. It increased
approximately ten percent from the pre-Markman I period until Festo, and
approximately another ten percent from Festo until the end of 2004. 213 So
while the opinions increased in size, the increase was not substantial and
most likely does not account for the change in word count of claim
construction and the doctrine of equivalents around these events. And more
importantly, the word count devoted to the doctrine of equivalents decreased
while the count for claim construction increased.
This data supports the view that doctrinal displacement occurred after
doctrinal reallocation and the doctrine of equivalents became less significant
after Markman. 214 The drop in Figure 8 after Markman is significant. The
trend continued after Festo, with the doctrine of equivalents becoming more
marginalized, and claim construction more important.
However, patent litigation is complex and word count information
cannot fully capture the significance of the doctrines. There may be multiple
confounding factors a word count analysis cannot decode. For example, the
data does not control for changes in complexity and difficulty in analyzing
claim construction or the doctrine of equivalents, if any, over time.
Nonetheless, the data is consistent with Allison and Lemley’s narrative that

212. The results of a t-test suggest a statistically significant difference between the
proportion of the word count devoted to claim construction before and after the Markman
opinion had been issued (t=-3.9403, p=0.0001). The results of a t-test also suggest a
statistically significant difference between the proportion of the word count devoted to the
doctrine of equivalents before and after the Markman opinion (t=2.9810, p=0.0033). Because
the distribution of the proportions of doctrine of equivalents word counts was not normal
(in contrast to the proportions for claim construction, which were), two alternative statistical
tests were performed. Both of these tests, a Wilcox-Mann-Whitney test (z=2.679, p=0.0074)
and a general linear model (z=-2.89, p=0.004), provide the same result.
213. The average discussion section before Markman I was 3154 words, between
Markman I and Festo, it was 3483 words, and after Festo until the end of 2004 it was 3876
words. That works out to a 10.4% increase after Markman I and an 11.3% increase after
Festo.
214. Scholars have used word court as a proxy for measuring the importance of an issue
in legal opinions. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 210.
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the doctrine of equivalents became less important as claim construction
became more so.
Some may assert that when a doctrine becomes more important, it is
natural for a court to temporarily increase the word count devoted to that
doctrine.215 The court in these circumstances needs to explain the enhanced
doctrine to litigants and lower courts. This account does not completely
explain the results of the present study. Figure 8 shows that the increase in
word count for claim construction was not an aberration lasting only a few
years. In fact, over time, claim construction occupied more and more
decision space.216 Similarly, some may argue that the increasing complexity of
technologies and patents may explain the results.217 However, the increasing
complexity should affect both claim construction and the doctrine of
equivalents.
This data, while only one way of analyzing the events, supports the view
that the doctrine of equivalents dropped in importance as claim construction
increased. The same trend can be analyzed by scrutinizing the opinions
themselves. For example, in the illustrative 1994 case Wolverine World Wide,
Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 218 the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of
summary judgment of non-infringement. 219 The court first considered the
district court’s claim construction of the term “forefoot-enveloping.”220 The
court affirmed the claim construction with a three-paragraph discussion over
the space of a page and a half.221 The court then disposed of the patentee’s
literal infringement appeal in two paragraphs.222 Finally, the Federal Circuit
rejected the patentee’s doctrine of equivalents appeal. 223 The doctrine of
equivalents analysis, although only two paragraphs in length, was more
thorough than the court’s analysis on other issues. The detailed analysis
examined two portions of the specification of the patent-in-suit and
215. The same can be said if the doctrine merely changes or becomes uncertain.
216. Furthermore, the variance in average word counts of the “Discussion” sections
over time does not appear to cause the results. There is some variance in the yearly word
count averages. The average word count of the “Discussion” sections of the opinions over
this ten-year period was approximately 3300 words. The average for eight of the ten years
fell within a relatively narrow band of the overall average, within twenty percent of 3300.
The data for two years fell outside this band, 1994 being lower and 1998 being higher.
217. Allison & Lemley, supra note 24, at 79 (noting increased complexity in patents from
the 1970s when compared to those from the 1990s).
218. 38 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
219. Id. at 1194.
220. Id. at 1196–98.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1198–99.
223. Id. at 1199–2000.
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compared how the patented invention operated with the accused products.224
After that analysis, the court affirmed the district court’s holding.225
In more recent cases, the doctrine of equivalents plays a lesser role,
especially when compared to claim construction. For example, in Welker
Bearing v. PHD, the Federal Circuit reviewed an opinion granting summary
judgment of non-infringement. 226 After setting forth details about the
patented technology and the district court proceedings, the opinion devoted
nearly five pages to the issue of claim construction.227 The term in dispute
was “mechanism for moving said finger.”228 The court devoted nearly two
pages discussing whether the claim was in means-plus-function format,
eventually concluding that the claim included language in means-plusfunction format.229
Thereafter, the Welker Bearing opinion delves into the details of the claim
construction for three solid pages of analysis. 230 The Federal Circuit
considered the patent specification, explicitly reciting and analyzing
information provided in six locations in the patent specification. 231 It
discussed the claim construction doctrines: claim differentiation, ordinary
meaning and clear disavowal of claim scope. 232 Finally, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s claim construction.233 As for literal infringement,
the opinion contains two paragraphs disposing of the issue.234 In those two
paragraphs, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion of no
literal infringement.235
Finally, the Federal Circuit reached the doctrine of equivalents. 236 In
affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit
opinion included only two paragraphs relating to the doctrine of
equivalents. 237 As described above, the Federal Circuit’s current opinions
focus much less on the doctrine of equivalents than pre-Markman opinions.
The lack of Federal Circuit focus supports the declining importance of the
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id. at 2000.
Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1095–99.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1095–97.
Id. at 1097–99.
Id. at 1098–99.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1099–1100.
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doctrine of equivalents. As discussed infra, this decline—whether the direct
result of the increased prominence of the claim construction doctrine,
substantive changes to the law of the doctrine of equivalents, or some
combination of the two—is consistent with doctrinal reallocation.
This decline of the doctrine of equivalents is partially attributable to the
case law’s development of limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. The
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit decided several doctrine of
equivalents cases. 238 These legal limits provided substantive changes in the
doctrine. A substantive change can directly increase or decrease the
importance of the doctrine. If a decrease in significance occurs, litigants may
raise the doctrine less frequently.
Alternatively, these case law developments may be thought of as another
doctrinal reallocation—moving part of the decision-making on the doctrine
of equivalents from the jury to the judge. Shifting to judicial decision-making
provides the court control to decide the importance of a doctrine. In contrast
to claim construction, the Federal Circuit used its control to diminish the
doctrine of equivalents. Petherbridge showed that the Federal Circuit
reversed district court holdings of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents and affirmed district court rejections of such infringement.239 In
other words, the Federal Circuit used its institutional power to weaken the
doctrine of equivalents after its doctrinal reallocation.
The conclusions reached by this study are consistent with the
conclusions of Allison, Lemley, and Petherbridge. Federal Circuit opinions
reduced emphasis on the doctrine of equivalents after Markman.240 Patentees
have little success on the doctrine of equivalents after Markman. 241 The
doctrine of equivalents has lost power as claim construction increased in
prominence and importance within patent law.242 However, further study is
needed on the exact timing of the decline of the doctrine of equivalents. It is
still unclear how much of the decline followed Warner-Jenkinson and Festo, and
how much already occurred before these decisions.
238. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Johnson & Johnston
Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S.
722 (2002).
239. Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra note 2, at 1386–87, 1399.
240. Id. at 1394; Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect, supra note 2, at 233.
241. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966–67; Petherbridge, Doctrine of Equivalents, supra
note 2, at 1387.
242. Allison & Lemley, supra note 2, at 966–67; Petherbridge, Claim Construction Effect,
supra note 2, at 233.
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Claim construction opinions are of limited precedential value beyond
interpreting the particular patent at issue. But others in the marketplace, such
as competitors, are often interested in the construction of the terms of any
litigated patent. Thus, appellate claim construction opinions are often
valuable beyond the immediate parties to the litigation. In contrast, opinions
on the doctrine of equivalents are not. The doctrine of equivalents analysis
will be specific to each individual accused product. In most cases, the
doctrine of equivalents analysis is not applicable to third parties.
Consequently, it makes sense to devote more resources to claim construction
information and opinions. That information is valuable to more entities than
information on the doctrine of equivalents.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article provides a novel theoretical model and extensive empirical
evidence to explain the decline of the doctrine of equivalents. In recent years,
John Allison, Mark Lemley, and Lee Petherbridge studied the doctrine of
equivalents. While these scholars noted and provided some evidence that the
successful use of the doctrine of equivalents decreased, none clearly
explained why. As such, the cause and precise mechanism behind the socalled “demise” of the doctrine of equivalents have largely remained a
mystery.
This Article explains that the demise occurred because of two
complementary forces discussed for the first time in this Article: doctrinal
reallocation and doctrinal displacement. Under doctrinal reallocation, a
substantive doctrine may become more important after a shift in adjudicative
control over that doctrine. Doctrinal displacement posits that an increase in
the importance of a doctrine may in turn decrease the importance of another,
typically related, doctrine. This Article’s empirical results support the position
that the demise of the doctrine of equivalents was a result of these twin
forces.
The study of doctrinal reallocation and doctrinal displacement in the law
and its after effects is merely beginning. Until this study, it has never been
formally discussed or empirically examined. The present study uses the
theories of doctrinal reallocation and doctrinal displacement to explain the
demise of the doctrine of equivalents. Further study is warranted to see
whether the phenomena can explain other changes in the law, in areas within
and beyond patent law. And it raises the further important question: is
doctrinal displacement intentional? Does the court know ex ante that
doctrinal reallocation likely leads to doctrinal displacement? If the court does,
it has never expressly acknowledged it.
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The general theories of doctrinal reallocation and displacement may allow
hypotheses on how proposed procedural changes will affect existing
doctrines. For example, some have argued to remove the doctrine of
obviousness in patent law from the control of the jury.243 What would be the
likely consequences of such a change? Which doctrine would be displaced?
Separately, what will happen if the pending patent reform bills244 are passed
by Congress? Displacement theory can help find the answers.

243. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624
(2009) (No. 09-198), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 806.
244. Patent Reform Act, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act, H.R. 1260,
111th Cong. (2009).
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APPENDIX: DETAILED REGRESSION TABLES
Table 4a: Regression for Hypothesis #1: Written Opinions
(corresponding to Figure 4, page 1193)

Variable
Case decided before Markman I
District court in 2nd Circuit246
District court in 3rd Circuit
District court in 4th Circuit
District court in 5th Circuit
District court in 6th Circuit
District court in 7th Circuit
District court in 8th Circuit
District court in 9th Circuit
District court in 10th Circuit
District court in 11th Circuit
District court in one of 10 busiest patent courts
Chemical Patent (PTO class)247
Electrical Patent (PTO class)
Appeal from grant of summary judgment248
Appeal from bench trial
Appeal from jury trial
Patentee won at district court
Pseudo R2
# Obs

Logistic Regression
Odds Ratio (Std. Error)245
2.861***
(.589)
1.098
(.426)
1.560
(.605)
1.618
(.720)
0.940
(.368)
1.468
(.582)
1.198
(.441)
1.502
(.615)
1.274
(.437)
1.300
(.612)
0.731
(.320)
1.133
(.177)
2.704***
(.569)
1.389
(.234)
1.427
(.334)
1.366
(.302)
0.475**
(.135)
1.309
(.249)
.0569
1247

245. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses.
246. Base circuit is 1st Circuit.
247. Base technology is mechanical.
248. Base appeal is from preliminary injunction ruling.
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Table 4b: Additional Logistic Regression for Hypothesis #1: Written Opinions
(corresponding to Figure 4, page 1193)

Variable
Case decided before Markman I
Case involved Claim Construction
Pseudo R2
# Obs

Logistic Regression
Odds Ratio (Std. Error)249
1.959***
(.193)
0.510***
(.043)
.0245
4234

Table 5a: Regression for Hypothesis #2: Precedential Opinions
(corresponding to Figure 5, page 1197)

Variable
Case decided before Markman I
District court in 2nd Circuit251
District court in 3rd Circuit
District court in 4th Circuit
District court in 5th Circuit
District court in 6th Circuit
District court in 7th Circuit
District court in 8th Circuit
District court in 9th Circuit
District court in 10th Circuit
District court in 11th Circuit
District court in one of 10 busiest patent courts
Chemical Patent (PTO class)252
Electrical Patent (PTO class)
Appeal from grant of summary judgment253
Appeal from bench trial
Appeal from jury trial
Patentee won at district court
Pseudo R2
# Obs

Logistic Regression
Odds Ratio (Std. Error)250
2.345***
(.490)
1.595
(.541)
1.236
(.400)
1.989
(.748)
1.209
(.417)
1.550
(.532)
1.309
(.422)
1.304
(.462)
1.282
(.385)
1.674
(.683)
1.137
(.457)
1.089
(.148)
2.784***
(.437)
1.729***
(.251)
1.582*
(.308)
1.358
(.243)
0.473**
(.136)
1.395*
(.219)
.0587
1247

249. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses.
250. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses.
251. Base circuit is 1st Circuit.
252. Base technology is mechanical.
253. Base appeal is from preliminary injunction ruling.
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Table 6a: Regression for Hypothesis #3: Summary Judgment
(corresponding to Figure 6, page 1199)

Variable
Case decided before Cybor
District court in 2nd Circuit255
District court in 3rd Circuit
District court in 4th Circuit
District court in 5th Circuit
District court in 6th Circuit
District court in 7th Circuit
District court in 8th Circuit
District court in 9th Circuit
District court in 10th Circuit
District court in 11th Circuit
District court in one of 10 busiest patent courts
Chemical Patent (PTO class)256
Electrical Patent (PTO class)
Patentee won at district court
Pseudo R2
# Obs

Logistic Regression
Odds Ratio (Std. Error)254
3.383***
(.537)
1.136
(.428)
1.175
(.424)
1.318
(.548)
1.387
(.535)
2.981**
(1.188)
1.400
(.499)
1.472
(.587)
2.573**
(.866)
1.230
(.561)
1.203
(.543)
1.140
(.182)
0.797
(.142)
1.438*
(.254)
0.084***
(.013)
.2437
1262

254. *** Significant at the .001 level, ** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the
.05 level, Standard errors in parentheses.
255. Base circuit is 1st Circuit.
256. Base technology is mechanical.
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